



CHALLENGING THE COP STATUS QUO

Proposals for a fairer and more efficient climate multilateralism

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Photo credit (cover page): Members of civil society during the People's Plenary at COP30 in Belem (Photo: © UN Climate Change - Kiara Worth)

Réseau Action Climat France is an organisation established in 1996 to weigh in on the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. Thus, COPs have been a cornerstone of its work for the past 30 years. **The aim of this publication is to share its vision of a multilateralism that works** and that could better respond to the harsh realities of the world we live in, whilst effectively addressing the issue of climate justice. This publication draws on this [2025 civil society declaration](#), which begins to lay the groundwork for reform of the UNFCCC.

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Introduction

THE CLIMATE CRISIS : A GLOBAL CHALLENGE LOOSING POLITICAL MOMENTUM

COP conferences and climate declarations have been taking place for over 30 years now. This forum for multilateral cooperation led to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and, subsequently, the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2015, which committed nations to limiting global warming to as close as possible to 1.5°C by the end of the century. Since then, it has come under increasing criticism and is losing momentum. This is hardly surprising, given that, beyond the legitimate criticisms that can be levelled at the COPs, **climate change is no longer high on the political agenda of most leaders** due to the rise of populism and the far right across the globe, and conflicts and violence against people. Yet extreme weather events continue to wreak havoc every year. The window for limiting global warming to 1.5°C by the end of the century is gradually closing, with lives, cultures and heritage, access to food, housing at stake.

Does this mean we should abandon multilateralism and move towards multi-stakeholderism, or 'minilateralism'? At first glance, this alternative is not the most desirable, as it creates a multi-speed international diplomatic system, which does not necessarily give a prominent place to the most vulnerable countries and allows the most powerful and privileged to choose their own system of cooperation (such as the OECD, the G7 and G20, the Paris Club on debt issues, etc.). **The fight for climate justice cannot succeed if it remains confined to an exclusive circle.**

¹ For more details, please consult Bertrand Badie, *La fausse énigme du Sud Global*, https://france.ATTAC.org/IMG/pdf/badie-possibles_40.pdf

THE IPCC: a cornerstone of climate multilateralism under attack

The IPCC, what is it? The IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Program and brings together a community of nearly 664 scientists from around the world. The IPCC's main remit is to assess, in each of its assessment cycles, the state of the latest scientific knowledge on climate change, drawing on the highest-quality publications from around the world. Thousands of scientific articles are reviewed, analysed and summarised for each IPCC report. Since its establishment, it has published six assessment reports and three special reports

The IPCC's work supported the creation of the UNFCCC in 1992 and inspired the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement. The first report provided the impetus for the establishment of the UNFCCC in 1992. In 2015, its special report on 1.5°C served as a cornerstone for the negotiations and helped set the global course for the Paris Agreement. The UNFCCC also draws on the IPCC's work to produce global assessments which, every five years, enable it to evaluate the situation and the commitments made by Parties (Global Stocktake).

Attacks against Science and IPCC are escalating. The anti-science movement extends far beyond the scope of the climate COPs but is becoming increasingly visible in the negotiations: there are more and more manoeuvres aimed at decoupling the IPCC's timetable from that of the next Global Stocktake, scheduled for 2028, with serious threats hanging over the budgets of scientists and the IPCC. Some countries refuse to mention the IPCC in the negotiation texts as a key source on climate change, whilst others refuse to refer explicitly to its recommendations.

Whilst the IPCC faces a number of challenges (notably that of ensuring the inclusion of scientists from the Global South), **there is no doubt that decision-makers must draw on the best available scientific knowledge in order to make informed decisions to protect people and our planet.** The credibility of the COPs and the Paris Agreement is at stake, with the ultimate aim of saving lives and ecosystems in the face of climate disasters. In 2025, at the COP in Belém, Parties reaffirmed in the Mutirão² "the centrality of equity and the best available science for effective climate action and policymaking, as provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change"

REFORMING THE COP SYSTEM TO CHALLENGE THE STATUS QUO AND LIMITATIONS

When it comes to climate, the dedicated multilateral forum is the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), with annual COPs (Conferences of the Parties), alongside the biennial COPs on biodiversity and desertification. **Despite their slowness and the frustration they cause, these COPs are based on a fundamental principle: one country, one vote.** This can be explained by the common understanding from Parties that global problems require global solutions and cooperation from all. Building on this foundation, which is legitimate for fairer governance and a multilateralism based on genuine cooperation, it is important to recognise that their ineffectiveness in truly addressing the climate crisis has

² Global Mutirão: *Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change*, FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/L.24, November 2025, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025_L24_adv.pdf

become increasingly visible. Gigantic COPs, with less results and more communication with a trade-show aspect, plus the over-complication of UNFCCC procedures and the weakened political ambition are showing that reform is necessary.

The challenges are of various kinds, and some are inherent to the functioning of the UNFCCC. Others, however, stem from the UN, the geopolitical context, and also from decisions taken at national level by individual states. Here is a (non-exhaustive) list of the challenges to be considered)³ :

- **Same negotiating dynamics since 1990 between the Global South and the Global North:** the EU seeks to secure binding commitments within the framework of negotiated emissions targets. The United States strives to secure maximum flexibility through a market-based approach. The G77 and China focus on issues of equity and financing⁴.
- Political failures and a **difficult geopolitical context**, which the negotiating rooms cannot avoid: energy crisis, wars and genocides, trade tensions, food insecurity...
- **The culture of consensus within the COPs and the lack of compliance mechanisms.** Every decision has to be approved by consensus and there is no sanction mechanism when countries fail to implement. This allows some Parties and actors to block the process and try to negotiate what has already been agreed. This also has led to an implementation gap as well as the creation of a plethora of dialogues and work programmes.
For instance, a decision was made to adopt the Mitigation Work Program under the Paris Agreement, a dedicated space for mitigation inside the negotiation. After all these years which is still not operational, given Parties have still not reach consensus on its functions, scope of it, etc. This is an intentional strategy for some Parties to delay action and impact.
- **The growing involvement of representatives of fossil fuel and agribusiness interests** (and other polluting industries), coupled with the increasing restriction of the space for observers from organisations representing the common good or Indigenous Peoples
- **The 1.5°C target is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve**, with new thorny discussions such as whether or not to regulate overshoot
- **The inherent limitations of an international framework for regulating action that is essentially national and sub-national in nature.** Indeed, helping to reduce global emissions requires colossal efforts on the part of states, across all sectors of the economy. This far-reaching transformation is provoking strong opposition from some stakeholders. Underlying this are legitimate concerns regarding a just transition for workers and social justice. This creates fertile ground for inaction and short-sighted political and economic trade-offs, to the detriment of future consequences.
- **Divergent interests:** By tackling climate change, many countries will benefit, but others could lose out (for example: oil-producing countries)

³ For more details, see Kaveh Guilanpour, *Achieving a more effective UNFCCC Process*, Discussion Paper C2ES, Juillet 2025, https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/20250728-C2ES-Achieving-a-More-Effective-UNFCCC-Process_FINAL.pdf and Daniel Bodansky, *The UN Climate Change Region Thirty Years on - A retrospective and Assessment*, Washburn Law Journal Vol.62, 2022, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epub/10.3233/EPL-219047>

⁴ Daniel Bodansky, *The UN Climate Change Region Thirty Years on - A retrospective and Assessment*, Washburn Law Journal Vol.62, 2022, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epub/10.3233/EPL-219047>

- Capacities and responsibilities that are very different. **The issue of equity is central here, and it is still not really being addressed properly at the COPs:** who should pay how much, to whom, and according to what responsibilities?

In this context, **It is difficult to maintain the consensus needed to make decisions** within the UNFCCC, as not all states find their best option in every text. In a world where diplomacy and cooperation are struggling to endure, negotiations will not become more effective, as countries have too many differences. **There is certainly a need for reform.**

BEYOND THE UNFCCC : A WORLD THAT HAS DRASTICALLY CHANGED, QUESTIONING THE CURRENT COP PROCESS

Climate governance began to take shape in the 1980s, then accelerated with the creation of the three United Nations framework conventions in Rio in 1992 (on climate, biodiversity and desertification). **It is important to recognise that the world has changed significantly** since this governance framework was established⁵ :

- Our scientific understanding of climate change has improved considerably
- Technology has advanced significantly, particularly with regard to the cost of renewable energy
- The global political landscape has changed: The United States is no longer the unique dominant power, we now live in a multipolar world
- National policies have changed: governments are devoting less effort to the climate crisis

There have therefore been both positive steps forward and setbacks, and the question we face today is: **what form of multilateralism can work in this increasingly violent and complex world?** Can it remain relevant and provide collective and fair solutions for all the world's citizens? The answer may begin by recalling what multilateralism should actually serve: we could speak of a fair and democratic collective stewardship of the planet, which goes beyond the framework of international relations, which are based on the principle of the nation-state⁶. At present, states – primarily the major powers and emerging powers – are clearly the main decision-makers, acting in accordance with their own interests. But they also constitute a force of inertia that must inevitably be overcome. **Sovereignty should no longer be understood as the priorities and interests of the state, but rather of the citizens and the ecosystems within its territory.** It is no longer an entity to be served as such. The logic here is the same as that underlying the question of sovereignty: we need security mechanisms for people, not for states. The current UN system, which is far broader in scope than the UNFCCC, has so far failed to change these fundamental aspects of global governance. This is therefore the greatest challenge it faces.

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Forum pour une nouvelle gouvernance mondiale, *Propositions pour une architecture du pouvoir juste et démocratique – Contribution au Sommet des Peuples*, Juin 2021, <http://rio20.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Propositions-pour-une-architecture-du-pouvoir-juste-et-d%C3%A9mocratique.pdf>

A few words on the UNFCCC model and the impact of its decisions

The UNFCCC aims to stabilise “the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (article 2⁷). **Three principles of justice serve as guidelines for achieving this objective: equity, responsibility and capacity**⁸. Since the Paris Agreement in 2015, the UNFCCC’s main and historic achievement, a governance approach has emerged. It is based on the idea that the processes implemented under the agreement will inevitably lead to peer comparisons that will inspire and encourage – rather than impose – action. Consequently, the resulting climate measures and rules emphasise procedural obligations rather than substantive obligations, and obligations of means rather than obligations of result⁹.

In summary, the Paris Agreement legally regulates processes but does not impose any specific requirements on countries concerning their climate targets, representing a hybrid of the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the Copenhagen Accord (2009)¹⁰. It is part of a catalytic/facilitating model of international law: it is based on the principle that states have at least some willingness to tackle a problem, but are constrained by their national policies¹¹. International law therefore has several roles to play in supporting them, without however coercing them (drawing international attention to an issue, encouraging a learning process, exerting moderate pressure on lagging states, facilitating capacity building, etc.). This distinguishes it from the prescriptive model (international law as an absolute lever, similar to national criminal law) and the contractual model, with treaties setting out mutually beneficial and reciprocal exchanges of promises. This is the basis of international agreements in many fields, notably arms control and trade.

However, with regard to the Paris Agreement, it was not intended merely to set processes in motion, but also to assess the substance of these processes through its ambition cycle. This cycle comprises Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), submitted every five years, as well as the submission of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs); biennial transparency reports, submitted every two years, and a global stocktake every five years. **The current danger, with so many processes being created but lack of evaluation and accountability mechanisms, is that the Agreement will be renegotiated rather than implemented.**

⁷ UNFCCC, Article 2 : Objective <https://unfccc.int/resource/ccsites/zimbab/conven/text/art02.htm>

⁸ Antonin Pottier, Aurélie Méjean, Olivier Godard, Jean-Charles Hourcade, *A Survey of Global Climate Justice: From Negotiation Stances to Moral Stakes and Back*, International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, 2017, 11(1), pp.1 – 53, https://www.centre-cired.fr/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/pottier_et_al_irere.pdf,

⁹ Lavanya Rajamani, Sebastian Oberthür, Kaveh Guilanpour, Harro van Asselt, *Re-Invigorating the UN Climate Regime in the wider landscape of climate action*, C2ES, 2023, <https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/reinvigorating-the-un-climate-regime-in-the-wider-landscape-of-climate-action.pdf>

¹⁰ Daniel Bodansky, Lavanya Rajamani, *The Issues that never die*, 2018

¹¹ Daniel Bodansky, *The UN Climate Change Regime Thirty Years on – A retrospective and Assessment*, Washburn Law Journal Vol.62, 2022, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epub/10.3233/EPL-219047>

6 key reforms to improve COP governance

1. Introduce a policy of conflicts of interest within the COP, in line with the requirements set out by the World Health Organisation

- Mandate the UNFCCC to establish a conflict-of-interest policy for COPs by 2030, starting with COP31.
- In the disclosure and transparency requirements effective since 2023, include a requirement for all participants (both observers and parties) to publicly disclose who is funding their participation, as well as a requirement to disclose conflicts of interest as part of the registration process.
- Whilst civil society and right holders' should be granted observer status in all negotiating forums, stakeholders representing private interests should only be granted access by invitation.

2. Propose new formats of dialogues and meetings, more agile and better suited

- Establishing a system where COPs between Global Stocktakes and NDC submissions are smaller and more focused on compliance and implementation rather than media stunts and theatrical final texts
- Proposing new formats to be tested so that states and non-state actors can work together on implementation (such as roundtables, technical dialogues etc)

3. Reform the process of decision-making

- Allow for majority decision-making within the UNFCCC in the event that consensus cannot be reached, by adopting the rules of procedure allowing voting processes or by amending the convention. The recent decision under the UN following the ICJ advisory opinion shows how these types of procedures can be successful.

4. Ensure more accountability and transparency concerning the Parties' progress

- Decide that NDCs will be submitted not only to the UNFCCC but also to the United Nations Secretariat to enhance credibility.
- Enhance the Facilitative, Multilateral Consideration of Progress dialogue to create more pressure on Parties's ambition, by making it accessible for the media and with possibilities for observers to participate

5. Review the selection criteria for the COP host country

- Ensure transparency and inclusivity in the preparations for the summit, in particular by publishing the host country's agreement immediately upon signing the agreement
- Demonstrate tangible progress towards achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement, and uphold the principles of the UNFCCC, in particular the protection of human rights and the rights of civil society and the people representing them
- Ensure a clear policy on conflicts of interest, particularly regarding the summit's partners and sponsors
 - a. At the very least, the COP Presidency teams should be required not to include lobbyists or business executives amongst their members

6. Facilitate participation in the COP and ensure that the fundamental rights of all participants are respected

- Establish a unified, simple, and equitable digital visa system that guarantees approval within one week for all accredited participants in UNFCCC meetings (including Bonn), in order to ensure equitable participation and prevent visa discrimination.
- The UNFCCC should mandate an independent focal point for human rights issues. This would ensure impartial handling of threats, harassment, and other human rights violations faced by observer groups and delegates, guaranteeing accountability and prompt redress.
- Provide systematically a physical space for observer constituencies so they can work and meet, such as the journalists can benefit from the media centre
- Integrate feedbacks from the UNFCCC constituencies inside the negotiation rooms, such as in the United Nations Committee on World Food Security

Decisions to take at COP31

Parties must **mandate the UNFCCC to establish a space in the negotiations for driving reforms**, which should enter the implementation phase following COP33 in 2028, alongside the Global Stocktake 2. Several options exist for creating this space:

- An item on the UNFCCC agenda
- A dialogue under the Arrangements for International Meetings (AIM) negotiations, which will be mandated to inform the Global Stocktake 2 as well as AIM decisions through 2028. This decision could be part of a COP31 cover decision or another negotiation space, since AIM is not at the agenda of COP31
- A chapter dedicated to reform in the 2028 Global Stocktake decision text

Challenge n°1: Securing civil society participation and access to climate negotiations

ACCESSIBLE COPs WITH A DEDICATED VISA PROCEDURE

COPs are becoming increasingly difficult for civil society and Indigenous Peoples to attend. Beyond the issue of costs, which have risen significantly since the early 2000s, there is a real need for assistance with visas. Indeed, whether for the annual Bonn intersessional meetings in June or for the COPs themselves, an increasing number of people, especially from the Global South, representing NGOs, Indigenous Peoples, or activists have seen their visa applications denied, or the procedures are so lengthy and inefficient that visas cannot be issued in time. This is also valid for delegates representing Global South countries. In their statement ¹² in June 2025, several UNFCCC constituencies and right holders proposed **establishing a unified, simple, and equitable digital visa system, guaranteeing approval within one week for all participants accredited to UNFCCC meetings.** Such a system was notably implemented for some recent COPs, such as in Dubai or in Belem. The UNFCCC Secretariat must incorporate these requirements into the agreements concluded with host countries, including the one it concluded with Germany for the Bonn intersessional meetings.

Finally, **language and physical barriers remain a major problem for many participants.** Specific measures must be implemented, such as providing sign language interpretation and closed captioning, or ensuring that venues are physically accessible.

COPs THAT MUST RESPECT ALL HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE ONE TO MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS

The effective exercise of fundamental freedoms and the right to participate is essential to effective and legitimate decision-making. **There are numerous examples de violation¹³ of these rights in the context of COP host countries,** ranging from the detention and denial of entry into Poland of activists during COP24 to the use of surveillance of climate activists during COP27. This has also been highlighted by the Special UN Rapporteur¹⁴ on Human Rights defenders. These restrictions¹⁵ concern the content and expression of protests, including the mention of country and company names, the requirement to submit slogans and photographs for prior approval, restrictions on designated locations, and the relatively short duration and size of protests. **As civic space shrinks globally, it is all the more unacceptable to see such a trend take place inside the United Nations.**

The UNFCCC should establish clear requirements to be included in agreements with COP host countries, which should also be open for public comment prior to signing and publication. Guaranteeing the rights of civil society organizations is a pre-requisite for effective negotiations. This demand concerns the COP

¹² CIEL, *United Call to Action - The COP we need*, Juin 2025, <https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/United-Call-to-Action-TheCOPWeNeed.pdf>

¹³ Centre for International Environmental Law, Global Climate Legal Defense, Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms, Amnesty International : *Call for input of the UN special Rapporteur on human rights defenders - The contribution made by human rights defenders to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and the challenges they face in this work*, June 2024, https://ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/UNSR-defenders-call-for-input-SDGs_CIEL-AI-CLIDEF-ECRF.pdf

¹⁴ Mary Lawlor, Special Rapporteur on human rights defender, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders*, United Nations General Assembly, July 2024, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3901284?v=pdf>

¹⁵ Usrof, M., Reyes, M., Schlosch, C., and Niedeggegen, L., *Protecting Civic Space: How Climate Advocacy is at Risk during UNFCCC Conferences*, 2026 [https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/68852161192044cdabeffa59/6a3b8be864b5913fff2364f5_\(WITH%20ANNEX\)%20SH%20REPORT%20\(digital\).pdf](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/68852161192044cdabeffa59/6a3b8be864b5913fff2364f5_(WITH%20ANNEX)%20SH%20REPORT%20(digital).pdf)

venue but also the national territory hosting the summit, during its entire duration. This minimum standard would be the respect and protection of human rights for all, including the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, and meaningful participation. In addition to strong safeguards to uphold human rights, the UNFCCC also needs mechanisms to monitor and redress harm and violations when they occur. **One useful measure would be to establish an independent focal point for human rights issues.** This would ensure impartial handling of threats, harassment, and other human rights violations faced by observer groups and delegates, guaranteeing accountability and prompt action. The focal point's mission would include gathering information, taking preventive and corrective measures, and facilitating remedies. This role requires a clear mandate recognized by the UNFCCC and the host country.

Finally, to best safeguard the rights of civil society organizations and Indigenous Peoples, it is crucial to **provide a physical space for observer delegations** so that they can work and meet effectively (including access to electrical plugs, sufficient Wi-Fi, and printers). Such a space should be systematically provided by the UNFCCC and should not be left to the discretion of the host, during COPs and in Bonn.

Case study: Participation modalities under the United Nations Committee on World Food Security (CFS)

The CFS established a mechanism to ensure the participation of Indigenous Peoples and civil society (CSIMP) in 2010. It allows for permanent consultation during negotiations, and thus goes well beyond the role of an observer. This means, among others, that civil society and Indigenous Peoples have access to the texts and information concerning the negotiations at the same time as the member states. Their opinions and contributions on the negotiating texts are directly presented during plenary sessions or in rooms dedicated to specific technical subjects. Member organizations include more than 300 million affiliated associations, organized into 11 different sectors. They are also grouped in geographical terms to ensure a balance of representation between the different continents. More information can be found directly on the mechanism's website: <https://www.csm4cfs.org/what-is-the-csm/>.

This mechanism and CFS inclusiveness, allowed direct and unified participation of civil society. There is no official CFS negotiation without civil society participants. Thanks to its inclusiveness, CFS policy products contain practical and efficient policy recommendations that meet the needs of the most affected by food insecurity. Financial contributions from Member States are essential to support the CSIMP, its secretariat and representativeness (e.g. all CSIMP meetings are systematically interpreted into English, Spanish and French)

Challenge n°2: Reduce the grip of polluting lobbies' interests through a policy on conflict of interests

COPs have been in existence for more than 30 years now. And yet, none of the COPs under the convention has a conflict-of-interest policy. **According to the organization Kick Big Polluters Out, year after year, representatives from the fossil fuel industry—as well as from agribusiness—are increasingly present at COPs.** At COP30, there were 1,600 lobbyists from the fossil fuel industry¹⁶ and more than 300 from agribusiness¹⁷. Another category that is often forgotten, is the carbon capture and storage industries, represented by over 500 lobbyists at COP30¹⁸. These companies often gain access to the COP through their national delegations, which not only provide them with a badge but also a pink “party-overflow” badge (see the box). This grants them access to most of the meeting rooms and allows them to exert direct influence on governments, while civil society actors are not permitted in those same rooms. Countries at COP30 that facilitated this access include France (22 badges, including 5 for TotalEnergies), Japan, or Norway.

This situation directly undermines their credibility, through direct influence on the negotiations and sponsorships¹⁹. In short, what would a conflict-of-interest policy at the UNFCCC look like? It would involve establishing a robust accountability framework to guard against any interference by companies and individuals with private interests, particularly those from the fossil fuel and high-emission/polluting industries.

To go into more detail, the UNFCCC must urgently formalize a definition of what constitutes a “conflict of interest,” drawing on best practices, and immediately establish an accountability framework²⁰ that prevents entities with private polluting interests from unduly influencing or compromising the UNFCCC’s activities and processes. An accountability framework should, among other things, exclude representatives and lobbyists from the fossil fuel industry and other high-emission industries from national delegations and COP presidencies (including presidency teams and support staff) and allow them access to conference centres only with yellow observer badges and by invitation to designated events only.

¹⁶ Kick Big Polluters Out, Communiqué, *Fossil fuel lobbyists flood COP30 climate talks in Brazil, with largest ever attendance share*, 14th November 2025, <https://kickbigpollutersout.org/Release-Kick-Out-The-Suits-COP30>

¹⁷ Kick Big Polluters Out, Communiqué, *More than 300 Big Ag lobbyists at COP30 climate talks*, 18th November 2025, <https://kickbigpollutersout.org/Big-Ag-Lobbyists-COP30-Release>

¹⁸ Centre for International Environmental Law, *531 Carbon Capture and Storage Lobbyists gained access to COP30 Climate Talks*, 17th November 2025, <https://www.ciel.org/news/531-carbon-capture-and-storage-lobbyists-gained-access-to-cop30-climate-talks/>

¹⁹ Example with Coca-Cola, official sponsor of COP22 : https://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2022/11/15/coca-cola-sponsor-de-la-cop27-et-champion-du-monde-de-la-pollution-plastique_6149885_3244.html

²⁰ Submission of 126 organisations to the UNFCCC, *Joint civil society submission on establishing a UNFCCC Accountability Framework to protect against undue influence of polluting interests*, 2022, https://corporateaccountability.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Joint-civil-society-submission-on-COI-Aug-17-2022_.pdf

The colour of badges: not so much a question of aesthetics as one of influence

The colour of the badges indicates the status of the person wearing them. Here is an overview of the most important colours:

PINK - PARTY: A representative of a state who has access to all negotiation rooms, delegation meetings, informal discussions between states, etc. A State may decide to issue pink badges to civil society organizations, companies, or universities in its country. It can be party badges (which constitutes a real power of influence), or **PARTY OVERFLOW**. They grant access to nearly all rooms, except for highly confidential and informal discussions.

YELLOW - OBSERVER: Representatives of civil society, the private sector, businesses, labour unions, or Indigenous Peoples. These badges grant access to the negotiation rooms, but only to listen, not to participate. States may decide to exclude observers at any time. This badge does not grant access to informal meetings or to meetings between delegations and negotiating groups.

ORANGE - MEDIA: As the name suggests, this badge is for journalists. They have access to the COP venue and can attend plenary sessions and events, but they cannot enter the negotiation rooms.

BLUE - UN: These badges are worn by UN staff and observers from other UN bodies, who have access to virtually all rooms, but only for coordination and logistical purposes.

Furthermore, the UNFCCC must build upon the mandatory disclosure requirements institutionalized in 2023 to ensure transparency. Next steps should include requiring all participants (both observers and Parties) to publicly disclose who is funding their participation both for Party and Observers, as well as requiring them to disclose conflicts of interest as part of the registration process, in line with the best practices of many other global institutions. **While civil society should benefit from observer status in all negotiation rooms, actors representing private interests should have access only by invitation and for specific discussions—such as thematic roundtables relevant to them—and so on.** Otherwise, they should be denied access to the COP, including the event area with the pavilions.

Good practice: the WHO's policy excluding the tobacco lobby from the tobacco control framework convention

The World Health Organisation is one of the first bodies under the UN, created in 1948 to try with states, social and private partners to promote health worldwide. Thanks to its long experience, it has seen the lobbying of private actors against various regulations, the most well-known being that of tobacco. But it also identified the food sector, for example, and even proposed in 2017 a note²¹ to help countries avoid conflicts of interest when preparing national policies on food.

Thus, returning to the subject of tobacco, the WHO created a framework convention for tobacco control (FCTC)²² that addresses from the outset the representation of private interests in public policies. Article 5 of the Convention reads: *"In setting and implementing their public health policies with respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect these policies from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law."* The harmful role of tobacco industry lobbying is even recognized in the preamble of the Convention: *"Recognizing the need to be alert to any efforts by the tobacco industry to undermine or subvert tobacco control efforts and the need to be informed of activities of the tobacco industry that have a negative impact on tobacco control efforts"*. Beyond denouncing, the FCTC has drafted guidelines²³ or Parties to fight against this lobbying at the national level and within the convention. It is stipulated in particular:

- *Parties should not nominate any person employed by the tobacco industry or any entity working to further its interests to serve on delegations to meetings of the Conference of the Parties, its subsidiary bodies or any other bodies established pursuant to decisions of the Conference of the Parties (4.9).*
- *Parties should ensure that representatives of State-owned tobacco industry does not form part of delegations to any meetings of the Conference of the Parties, its subsidiary bodies or any other bodies established pursuant to decisions of the Conference of the Parties (8.3).*

In addition, the COP adopted a procedure for the selection and accreditation of representatives with observer status, as well as for the selection and accreditation of members of the media and the public. These categories must submit an expression of interest form before the meeting.

To better understand how this Convention is functioning, there is this guide: <https://fctc.who.int/fr/resources/publications/i/item/information-kit-for-delegates-to-the-conference-of-the-parties-to-the-who-framework-convention-on-tobacco-control>

If this was possible on the issue of tobacco, it is possible on the issue of climate. It would only be necessary to adopt rules of procedure and adequate guidelines under the UNFCCC to protect the integrity and credibility of this process, as has been done for many others, not just the WHO.

²¹ Draft approach for the prevention and management of conflict of interest in the policy development and implementation of nutrition programmes at country level, Introductory Paper, 04.12.2017, https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/nutritionlibrary/safeguarding-against-possible-conflicts-of-interest-in-nutrition-programmes/nutrition-introductory-paper.pdf?sfvrsn=3fa31e18_2

²² Framework Convention for Tobacco Control, 2003, <https://iris.who.int/server/api/core/bitstreams/59aabf5c-c108-4039-b427-1572be49410d/content>

²³ Guidelines for application of Article 5.3, 2013, <https://fctc.who.int/fr/resources/publications/m/item/guidelines-for-implementation-of-article-5.3>

Challenge n° 3: Challenge the COP's format to maximize efficiency

The COPs have succeeded in their primary mission, which is to enable nations to meet annually to try to establish common goals in the fight against climate change, as well as against desertification and the loss of biodiversity. Without the climate COPs, for example, the Paris Agreement certainly would never have come into existence. And so, right now, we would be on a trajectory toward warming of more than 4°C by the end of the century. The impact is therefore measurable.

However, it must be acknowledged that the COPs are lacking efficiency and credibility: despite annual negotiations, it is clear that the goals of the Paris Agreement are far from being achieved. The COPs seem to continue producing numerous documents and processes, but these have little impact in national capitals and local communities. **And one of the reasons for this is the current format of the COPs.** Over the years, UNFCCC conferences have grown to excessive proportions and have increasingly taken on the character of a trade show with extensive commercialization of the event space. These spaces serve as platforms for public relations, lobbying, and technology demonstrations, many of which reflect corporate interests rather than the scientific principles of mitigation or equity. At the same time, many Indigenous peoples, civil society—particularly young people participating without financial support—and delegates from the Global South facing budget constraints are excluded from meaningful participation, both physically and politically. Furthermore, the vast disparities in the size of delegations from the Parties exacerbate inequality in the negotiations.

For now, the COPs aren't really designed to go beyond negotiations. While it will be important to maintain forums of this type—such as negotiations for climate finance, which to this date continues to be gravely underdelivered by developed countries—we must also create spaces where it is not diplomats and negotiators who meet²⁴, but rather more local and national actors who implement climate policies (government agencies, local governments, civil society, businesses, labour unions, etc.).

The system and criteria for allocating badges to observers must be fair and predictable, and should be significantly reformed to ensure geographical balance and strengthen meaningful engagement. Such a reform must take into account the fact that not all stakeholders are rights holders and that not all rights holders are the same: for example, a differentiated status reflecting the individual and collective rights of Indigenous Peoples is necessary to ensure their appropriate protection and inclusion.

Another area worth exploring would be working towards **better synergies between the various COPs and Rio Conventions:** it is important to note that, at present, there is no framework enabling presidencies to coordinate their efforts across COPs on climate change, biodiversity, desertification and soon, oceans. An initial step could be holding an annual meeting with all these presidencies (even though some COPs take place every two years) to work together on the agendas and ensure harmonisation. To take this further, we could envisage monitoring systems that are standardised across the various COPs, with a single document bringing together the different national plans, rather than having one document for climate COPs (NDCs and NAPs), another for biodiversity COPs (NBSAPs – National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans), and so on. Why not also consider harmonising the timetables for the Global Stocktakes under each convention and turning them into a single summit, held every five years?

²⁴ Lavanya Rajamani, Sebastian Oberthür, Kaveh Guilanpour, Harro van Asselt, *Re-Invigorating the UN Climate Regime in the wider landscape of climate action*, C2ES, 2023, <https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/reinvigorating-the-un-climate-regime-in-the-wider-landscape-of-climate-action.pdf>

Finally, regarding the format of COPs, it would be worth considering a new era in which high-profile, large-scale COPs are not held every year, but rather only for COPs featuring a Global Stocktake (the most recent in 2023, the next in 2028) or COPs marking a new NDC cycle (the most recent in 2025, the next in 2030). As noted in the following paper²⁵ **it is necessary to move away from so-called “big-bang” COPs focused almost exclusively on media-friendly outcomes**, at least not every year. In the interim, COPs could adopt a format similar to the current Bonn process, featuring technical and more concrete discussions on implementation that do not require major texts or pavilions at every session. We could envision roundtables, for example, that allow countries as well as other stakeholders to discuss sectors in transition, and to attempt to clarify the measures or figures in COP decisions by adding timelines and specific targets (such as phasing out fossil fuels, but also allocating funds for climate finance, etc.).

The 2028 Global stocktake: a window of opportunity to tackle COP governance challenges²⁶

The Stocktake will take place in 2028 and could be a crucial moment for launching a reform process, as it is set to produce a decision that can address the shortcomings of the current system. Indeed, this document could:

- Establish a three-year reform process within the UNFCCC
- Mandate the UNFCCC to establish a conflict-of-interest policy within the COPs by 2030 and a review of compliance mechanisms that should be enhanced / created under the UNFCCC
- Propose new formats to be tested so that States and non-state actors can work together on implementation (such as roundtables and technical dialogues)
- Establish an accelerated process to address concrete barriers (financial and non-financial) to implementation
- Invite the United Nations system, multilateral development banks, and international financial institutions to align their efforts to help countries develop and implement high-quality NDCs capable of attracting investment
- Announce that NDCs will be submitted not only to the UNFCCC but also to the United Nations Secretariat to enhance credibility

²⁵ Ibid, P.12

²⁶ Ibid for more details

Challenge n°4: Readjusting the decision-making process to ensure fairness and equity

There is a profound imbalance in the voices shaping the global response to the climate crisis. The countries with the most economic, military and trade power often have a greater voice than others, although they represent a minority of states. Using that context, **certain countries hold back collective progress in order to protect their short-term national interests, whilst those most affected by the climate crisis are sidelined.** The Earth is a common good, and climate decisions should serve the interests of the communities affected. It is time to stop pretending that a process involving 198 countries aimed at resolving a global crisis can continue to function on the basis of the lowest common denominator. To restore the legitimacy and credibility of the COPs, we must therefore redress the balance of power and reform the decision-making process.

How decision-making can be influenced by an understanding of fairness in relation to emission rights

Indeed, beyond political calculations and economic interests, **it is worth understanding how states perceive their rights before making a decision in the global climate governance.** This may explain the deep divisions which, in a time of tension and conflict, are difficult to overcome, or even to listen to. Here is an overview provided by the journal *International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics*²⁷ :

- The atmosphere is a global public good; every citizen of the Earth has an equal right to use it (a view championed by India in particular)
- The allocation of emission reduction obligations should be based on countries' historical responsibility for global warming (a view championed by Brazil in particular, and by developing countries more broadly)
- Victims should be compensated for any harm suffered (a view held mainly by the most vulnerable countries and island states)
- Long-term equality amongst individuals in a world where development inequalities should gradually disappear (a view held mainly by European countries)
- States are sovereign and no international institution can impose rules. A framework for tackling climate change is based on voluntary cooperation (a view held by the United States)

At present, the COP operates on the basis of consensus: this means that no COP decision can be adopted as long as one of the parties opposes it. Whilst this promotes a sense of democracy and, above all, ensures a collective response to climate change, it also creates significant deadlocks that could be avoided if consensus was not the only option. The UNFCCC should allow for super majority decision-making (2/3) in the event that consensus cannot be reached. It should take inspiration from other UN bodies such as the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA), the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and even the Green Climate Fund (GCF), among others, where this option already exists. Where consensus is weaponized, the same deadlocks as in the UNFCCC can be verified, such as in the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Plastic Pollution. States must accept

²⁷ Antonin Pottier, Aurélie Méjean, Olivier Godard, Jean-Charles Hourcade, *A Survey of Global Climate Justice: From Negotiation Stances to Moral Stakes and Back*, *International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics*, 2017, 11(1), pp.1 – 53, https://www.centre-cired.fr/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/pottier_et_al_irere.pdf, P.14 and 15

the possibility of majority decision-making to break deadlocks when attempts to reach consensus have failed. Many examples have shown that when voting procedures are allowed, negotiations tend to be more productive and final agreements more ambitious²⁸. That can be illustrated by the recent adoption of a resolution welcoming and operationalizing the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice by the UN: it was organised not by consensus but by majority vote and followed a lengthy process of discussing and achieving a text that still had many strong elements. And having voting prevented some countries from attaching unhelpful amendments at the last minute (as they were voted down)²⁹.

It seems difficult, if not impossible, to bring about such a change, since, in order to allow for majority voting, all States would have to accept this new decision-making procedure. However, if it has worked in numerous other forums – notably at the COP meetings on biodiversity of the GCF – then it is also possible within the climate COPs.

There are two possible ways to get progress on this matter:

- **Finalise and adopt the rules of procedures under the UNFCCC, which include the possibility of voting in their current draft text. These rules were never adopted because Parties could not reach a consensus.** In other words, the UNFCCC decision-making rules are still under a draft for 30 years now. The draft rules include the rule 42 that describe the vote-process when consensus is not achieved³⁰, and this could be unbracketed and included in rules that are finally adopted. This process could work if there is enough pressure from the civil society and a strong COP presidency leadership, as well as support from the UNFCCC secretariat and the Parties to drive it correctly. It is important to recall that consensus does not mean the agreement of all Parties, but the lack of objections. In the past, some COP Presidencies claimed texts being adopted, while a very small minority of Parties were not agreeing in the plenary or in the negotiation rooms. So, in fact, this concept of adopting with the agreement of the majority, and not all Parties, is already used inside the UNFCCC, but not formally.
- **Amend the convention. There is a long-standing a proposal from Mexico and Papua New Guinea to amend the article 7, suggesting Parties to agree on rules of procedures by a three-fourth majority vote,** while the financial rules would stay agreed by consensus³¹. Such an amendment would require a three-fourth majority, while the adoption of the rules of procedures would need consensus.

REFORM THE SELECTION CRITERIA OF THE COP HOST COUNTRY AND PRESIDENCIES

When it comes to efficiency and decision-making at COPs, the role of the presidencies is very important. They draw up the agenda, organise day-to-day negotiations and ultimately prioritise the outcomes at the end of the COP. They also have a real influence on the level of ambition of these outcomes. **In recent years, it has become clear that there are several areas for improvement in this regard, starting with ensuring that future COP presidencies possess the necessary political will and diplomatic expertise.**

This means several diplomatic processes and rules to respect, as pointed out by Transparency International in a recent policy paper: **next COP presidencies need to be driven by “integrity”**³². This means transparency and inclusion in the organisation of the summit, as well as leadership and integrity in the negotiation space.

²⁸ CIEL, *Breaking the Deadlock: Why and How Voting Can Advance the Climate Negotiations Thirty Years On*, June 2026, <https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/CIEL-UNFCCC-Decision-Making-Briefing-Note.pdf>

²⁹ Ibid page 6

³⁰ Ibid page 12

³¹ Ibid page 14

³² Gvantsa Gverdtseteli, *High Integrity Talks – How COP31 Presidency can set a new standard for climate leadership*, Policy Paper, Transparency International, 2026, https://files.transparencycdn.org/images/2026_High-Integrity-Talks_Policy-Paper.pdf

This could be for example an alignment on the 1.5°C limit from the Paris Agreement and public support for the Advisory Opinion³³ of the International Court of Justice concerning obligations of states in respect of climate change. COPs must also be safe, accessible, with an early publication of the Host Country agreement, propose conflict of interests safeguards and allow transparency in the negotiation and consultation process³⁴.

It is in the interests of the process's legitimacy to reform the host country selection procedure. Future hosts of the UNFCCC must demonstrate tangible progress towards achieving the objectives and goals and must respect the principles of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, as indicated in section 1 on participation, they must put in place robust human rights safeguards to respect and protect human rights, as well as the rights of Indigenous Peoples, future generations and workers. At the very least, COP Presidency teams should be required, like all Parties' delegations, not to include lobbyists or business executives among their members. All contracts and consultancy services relating to hosting the COP and preparing for the Presidency should be made public without delay, as should details of meetings organised by the COP Presidency team.

One final point would be to reconsider **the timeline for the COP President taking office**, which officially begins on the day of its own COP. However, diplomatic work takes place well in advance, so it would be worth exploring a format whereby the presidency begins at the June session – almost six months before the COP, for example.

³³ International Court of Justice, *Advisory Opinion on Obligations of in respect of Climate Change*, July 2025, <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/187/187-20250723-adv-01-00-fr.pdf>

³⁴ For more details, *ibid* page 7

Challenge n°5 : Reform the United Nations to allow more climate accountability

The functioning and credibility of the UNFCCC depend heavily on that of the UN. **The first question to ask is: Is the UN still an effective and relevant institution?** Yes, but only with a proper democratic reform, by strengthening participation forums for civil society, going beyond mere consultation and focusing on decisions³⁵. The *Forum pour une nouvelle gouvernance mondiale* proposes other examples of desirable reform, including removing the veto power in the Security Council for more democracy, or diminishing the role of other Western organizations (such as the IMF or NATO) or geopolitical groupings. (G7, G20 or OECD) that receive a lot of political attention. **Only a global response can lead to more democratic and just global governance, which for now exists only within the UN.** Any reform is therefore welcome and necessary, and it turns out that the UN80 reform could have supported such an approach.

Announced by the UN Secretary-General in March 2025 and approved by the General Assembly in July 2025, this initiative revolves around three main areas of work: improving efficiency, the review of the implementation of mandates and structural and programmatic reorganization³⁶. The Secretary-General's assessment is unequivocal³⁷ : **the UN system has evolved into a patchwork of entities**, many with overlapping mandates and functions, as well as fragmented governance. **While the initial set of proposals in this UN80 process reflects a genuine administrative will, they reflect a reactive attitude focused on urgent budgetary measures, not systemic renewal**³⁸. Member states are demanding more efficiency, transparency and accountability, but are opposed to the redistributive negotiations that genuine reform requires. They urge the UN Secretariat to do more with less, but are hesitant to clarify priorities, align mandates with resources, or endorse structural simplification when it affects national interests.

Several ideas are emerging to improve the governance of the UN. Some are quite general, **such as prioritizing and classifying mandates** (it should be noted that since its creation, the UN has accumulated 40,000 mandates and there is no mechanism to close or classify them³⁹). In fact, if the mandates are clarified, classified or even closed for many, this would allow for better budget allocation. **There could also be audits and evaluations of reform measures to measure their impact.** Moreover, there are several entities within the UN whose remit is to carry out monitoring and evaluation, such as the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), the Joint Inspection Unit, and the UN Board of Auditors⁴⁰. Certainly, these spaces could be mobilized in a more effective but also broader way, for example to analyze the current climate governance in the UN and propose ways of improving it.

WHAT ABOUT A UN CLIMATE COUNCIL?

An interesting idea for climate governance in particular has been proposed by Brazil: **a UN climate council**, which would not be under the UNFCCC but rather under the General Assembly. Its main mission would be to

³⁵ Forum pour une nouvelle gouvernance mondiale, *Propositions pour une architecture du pouvoir juste et démocratique - Contribution au Sommet des Peuples*, June 2021, <http://rio20.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Propositions-pour-une-architecture-du-pouvoir-juste-et-d%C3%A9mocratique.pdf>

³⁶ Thibault Camelli, *Unlocking Reform Capacity - What UN80 reveals about the limits and the possibilities of UN reform*, Center on International Cooperation New York University - September 2025 <https://cic.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Unlocking-Reform-Capacity-September-2025.pdf>

³⁷ Report of the Secretary General, *Shifting Paradigms - United to Deliver, Workstream 3 : Changing structures and realigning programmes*, 2025 https://www.un.org/un80-initiative/sites/default/files/2025-09/UN80_WS3-1_250921_1238.pdf

³⁸ Thibault Camelli, *Unlocking Reform Capacity - What UN80 reveals about the limits and the possibilities of UN reform*, Center on International Cooperation New York University - September 2025 <https://cic.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Unlocking-Reform-Capacity-September-2025.pdf>

³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁰ Better World Campaign, *Ensuring Efficiency and Accountability*, Mars 2025 <https://betterworldcampaign.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/UN-Reform-Explained.pdf>

accelerate the implementation of the Paris agreement⁴¹, with faster decision-making especially on urgent issues such as increasing funding for the fight against climate change. **This would not be a substitute for the UNFCCC**, but an additional body that would allow emergencies to be addressed more quickly.

- Such a council would be useful to **respond to the climate disasters** that will accumulate over the years, especially for the affected countries in the Global South which, for now, are either too little supported or too late.
- It could also strengthen accountability by serving **as a platform to receive, like the UN Human Rights Council, complaints from individuals and non-state actors** about egregious violations of states' climate obligations. Such a complaint mechanism, even if it does not lead to binding decisions, would have a symbolic significance and a considerable signal effect⁴².

Other functions could be considered. The council could operate like the UN Human Rights Council with a representative of the 5 UN regions, holding a mandate for a limited time, with the possibility for members from each region to rotate. Or it could also follow the classification of negotiating groups within the UNFCCC, notably with the representation of least developed countries (LDCs) and island countries (SIDS) as separate entities⁴³. Finally, it could be supported by a dedicated secretariat or rotating presidencies.

Obviously, such a measure is not easy to achieve, it requires the agreement of a large majority of countries under the UN General Assembly to give it legitimacy. And it is not a new institution that will resolve the lack of commitment by states to climate justice, nor will it eliminate the differences between them. **Despite these risks, the creation of such an institution could be a good compromise, ON THE CONDITION that it comes along with a comprehensive reform of the UNFCCC and the COPs.**

⁴¹ Kaveh Guilanpour, Lavanya Rajamani, *The Proposal for a New Climate Change Council*, Discussion Paper, C2ES and Oxford University, April 2025 <https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/C2ES-Climate-Change-Council-Proposal-FINAL.pdf>

⁴² Ibid

⁴³ Ibid

Conclusion

For more than 30 years, climate governance with the UNFCCC has been navigating around issues of equity, responsibility and accountability for Parties, trying to move forward while maintaining the vagueness and ambiguity⁴⁴ so that everyone can find their way. **Unfortunately, the divergences are becoming more and more violent between states and cohesion is beginning to break down.** We should therefore try to clarify these principles so that climate governance can move forward. This would mean asking sensitive questions, such as the following, which could arise for European countries⁴⁵: do you really want stronger rules in terms of accountability and transparency within the UNFCCC, and in some cases, are you ready to accept more differentiation between countries? This type of divergence, not really discussed, increases mistrust between countries and prevents collective decision-making.

Beyond these fundamental questions, several leavers to reform the UNFCCC are necessary and achievable, like it was exposed in this publication. Find a new format for the COPs, ensure that human rights are respected and that civil society can properly participate, establish a robust conflict of interest policy, and review decision modalities, at the latest during the Global Stocktake in 2028.

It is important to work on several fronts, because it is clear that the current system is not working well enough. Multilateralism has not adapted itself to its environment throughout history; we have had to try things, risk losing time, and propose institutions that seemed inconceivable. Today, we are certainly in a similar situation, where courage and daring are necessary. After all, it is about saving lives in the face of climate change, and even the most difficult efforts are worth it.

⁴⁴ Daniel Bodansky, Lavanya Rajamani, *The Issues that never die*, 2018

⁴⁵ Ibid

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RÉSEAU ACTION CLIMAT

Le Réseau Action Climat-France, fédération de 37 associations nationales et locales, lutte contre les causes des changements climatiques, de l'échelle internationale à l'échelle locale. Il est le représentant français du Climate Action Network International, réseau mondial de plus de 2500 ONG. Il couvre l'ensemble des secteurs responsables du dérèglement climatique : les transports, la production d'énergie, l'agriculture et l'alimentation, l'habitat, et travaille à l'élaboration de mesures alternatives et ambitieuses pour lutter contre le changement climatique et ses impacts.

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Le Réseau Action Climat fédère les associations impliquées dans la lutte contre le dérèglement climatique

