



overview  
of multi-  
stakeholder  
coalitions

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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

|         |  |
|---------|--|
| COP:    | Conference of the Parties                                    |
| DeSIRA: | Development Smart Innovation through Research in Agriculture |
| FPIC:   | Free, informed and prior consent                             |
| IPCC:   | Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change                    |
| MPGCA:  | Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action              |
| NDC:    | Nationally Determined Contribution                           |
| NGO:    | Non-governmental Organization                                |
| OPS:    | One Planet Summit  |
| UN:     | United Nations   |
| UNEP:   | United Nations Environment Programme                         |
| UNFCCC: | United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change        |

## methodology

This report provides an overview of the current landscape of multi-stakeholder climate coalitions and analyzes how these coalitions are contributing, or not, to achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement.

In 2014, France and Peru initiated the Lima-Paris Action Agenda, a space of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) dedicated to exchange on and promote multi-stakeholder initiatives on climate issues. In addition, France—beyond its interest in these coalitions and its continued support for the Action Agenda—has itself created a multi-stakeholder space: The One Planet Summit (OPS). It is for this reason that this report analyzes some of the commitments made by France and some of its practices within multi-stakeholder spaces.

Given the considerable proliferation of these coalitions, it has not been possible to list them all in this report. The information used here is thus limited to that referenced in the Global Climate Action portal, the Climate Initiatives Platform, and the OPS website, as of July 1, 2020. All initiatives coming from OPS have been considered as multi-stakeholder coalitions, as the website itself presents them.

These three databases bring together 321 coalitions (see Annex 2). The data in this report, except for the information on where and when the coalitions were formed, comes solely from these sources. For this reason, it is possible that the information disclosed by the coalitions on the tracking platforms is not representative of how they actually operate,

or of their activities, particularly due to the lack of information they have provided<sup>1</sup>. Conversely, a coalition that has a very advanced profile on platforms regarding its governance or evaluation mechanisms is not necessarily exemplary in reality. *Réseau Action Climat France* has nonetheless chosen this methodology to present an overview based on the information available on the platforms dedicated to coalitions. Our overview analyzes the major trends emerging for all the coalitions and, in more detail, several sectors closer to the expertise of the members of *Réseau Action Climat France*: Agriculture, Land Use and Forestry, and Energy Production / Energy Efficiency. This more specific analysis covers 107 coalitions.

For clearer classification in this overview, the subnational actors, which are federal states, regions, departments and municipalities, are not included in the category of central States. It is clear, however, that the work of central governments and of subnational actors are interlinked.

The present overview is not intended to provide a quantitative assessment of the impact of multi-stakeholder coalitions in achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement. By aggregating the data from the various sources and analyzing a few representative examples, it seeks both to provide greater transparency on what exists and to highlight both good and bad practices. The purpose of this exercise is to work out proposals for improving the governance and impact assessment of these coalitions.

# summary of analyses and conclusions

## What role for coalitions?

- A multi-stakeholder coalition can **facilitate cooperation** between different types of actors, such as States, civil society, subnational actors, and companies. Its added value lies in its ability to bring together those actors who are not used to working together, either because they come from different sectors (e.g. agriculture, transport, climate finance, energy production, etc.) or because they do not work in the same geographical area. This cooperation can lead not only to better understanding of a common problem, but also to efficiency in the way to solve it.
- It can **shed light on sectors and issues that are under-regulated**. The exchange between different types of actors on a common issue can enable the State to understand the pitfalls and to take political decisions in order to better support or supervise the actors involved.
- It can be a **tool for collective implementation** of policy decisions to help States meet their climate objectives. By bringing together the relevant stakeholders, it offers an implementation platform that enables better ownership and application of a measure or project.

## The limits observed in this overview

- **Unbalance in how the actors are represented:** Of the 107 sector-based coalitions studied (Agriculture, Land Use & Forestry, and Energy), States have a presence in 54% of the coalitions and companies in 50%; NGOs have a presence in only 33%.
- Based on the overall data from the 321 coalitions in the present overview, 46% of the coalitions have weak governance and 19% do not mention any at all. **Consequently, most of these coalitions lack transparency** on how they operate and on their decision-making systems.
- **The lack of monitoring and evaluation of the impact of the coalitions is also striking:** of the 321 coalitions, 68% provide no monitoring or evaluation information on the UN and OPS coalition platforms.

Given this situation, there are various risks concerning multi-stakeholder coalitions:

- **A risk that they may substitute** for States and their climate obligations, as coalitions are generally at the forefront because of their declared objectives (notably to reduce greenhouse gas emissions).
- **A risk of greenwashing**, whereby members use the coalition as a mere communication tool, without implementing the commitments made in the framework of the coalition.
- As their real impact is rarely calculated or accessible, the actions of the coalitions sometimes prove to be **in contradiction with the principles of the Paris Agreement**. Some coalitions promote sectors such as fossil fuels and climate-smart agriculture, which do not contribute to the protection of the environment or human rights.

## Our recommendations and ideas for solutions

- Multi-stakeholder coalitions should be seen as tools for implementing national climate objectives, **not as substitutes for States.**
- **States (such as France) are key funders of the coalitions** and should demand more monitoring and evaluation, as well as registration on the Global Climate Action portal, which is a UN monitoring tool.
- **The UNFCCC must be the space for monitoring and evaluating the impact of global climate action,** and thus of multi-stakeholder coalitions. Registration on the Global Climate Action portal should be mandatory for coalitions to be able to be taken into account in the UN spaces. The portal must be updated **annually, coalitions and actors that do not provide their information correctly must be excluded** from UN spaces until full information on the platform has been obtained. **Entry criteria** must also be established, as should provisions for exclusions of coalitions that directly or indirectly support fossil fuels and/or nuclear energy, and for coalitions that cause human rights violations.
- **States must take into account the information on non-state action** identified by the UNFCCC and adapt their NDCs accordingly, particularly in terms of emission-reduction targets.
- States must recognize that the Permanent Secretariat of the **UNFCCC** need a **formal mandate** as the **guarantor of monitoring and evaluation of multi-stakeholder coalitions.** They must also provide the Permanent Secretariat with the **human and financial resources needed** to do so.

## Recommendations for France

- **France** is present in many coalitions, where it has more or less ambitious objectives. France **should focus on transparent and transformative coalitions** and withdraw from others.
- France has established an international multi-stakeholder platform, the One Planet Summit, which does not have an effective monitoring and evaluation mechanism and whose initiatives are not systematically listed on the Global Climate Action portal. This situation must change quickly. **The next OPS summit will be an opportunity to endorse a robust evaluation system and automatic registration of coalitions on the UN platform.**

# introduction

## The role of multi-stakeholder coalitions in international climate governance is constantly growing.


Over the last decade, international climate governance has evolved towards increasing decentralization and complexity<sup>2</sup>. Various analyses have pointed out that its fragmentation and polycentricity have led to a hybrid multilateralism<sup>3</sup> characterized by increasing involvement of non-state actors in climate issues, in addition to that of States. In this new international polycentric framework, the UNFCCC takes on the role of a facilitator<sup>4</sup> that orchestrates traditional (State) actors of multilateralism and non-state actors.<sup>5</sup>

Non-state actors had already attended the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. But it was the disappointment of Copenhagen in 2009<sup>6</sup> that put into motion their dynamic of commitment, as governments seemed unwilling to assume their responsibilities in the face of climate change.<sup>7</sup> This is how the concept of “multi-stakeholder”<sup>8</sup> has come to be increasingly used: this theory proposes another model of political decision-making, which makes different

stakeholders partners in a problem or a solution. It is not just a matter of bringing several sectors together and letting them have exchanges. Sometimes the actors involved in this type of collaboration establish a permanent body, thereby leading to coalitions being formed. There are also “sub”-coalitions, which find their place within an umbrella coalition.

Since 2015, the Paris Agreement has officially recognized the role of non-state actors<sup>9</sup> as a pillar for discussion and exchange within the UNFCCC, with observer status. They are also formally integrated via spaces such as the Global Stocktake and the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action (MPGCA), the successor to the Action Agenda. This recognition has led to a real effervescence of multi-stakeholder coalitions. Of the 321 coalitions in this overview, which were founded between 1973 and 2019, more than half were created between 2014 and 2019 (Graph 1)

**GRAPHIQUE 1 :**  
PERIOD IN WHICH THE MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COALITIONS WERE FORMED  
(GENERAL DATABASE, 321 COALITIONS)




## Variable definitions and functions

There are different definitions of multi-stakeholder coalitions. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) describes them as initiatives that are generally led by actors other than States or the UNFCCC Secretariat (i.e. cities, regions, companies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), etc.), and that enable these various actors to make commitments together and collaborate better. But this does not mean that States and UN organizations are not stakeholders. On the contrary, they are often members of coalitions, donors or initiators<sup>10</sup>.

Non-state actors and coalitions take on different functions<sup>11</sup>:

reducing direct greenhouse gas emissions, disseminating knowledge and expertise, mobilizing funds, and supporting a country's climate policy. National contexts also influence how coalitions operate. The case of the United States<sup>12</sup> shows that non-state actors can take over when a State withdraws from climate policy: indeed, that country's NDC could be implemented almost exclusively through the commitments of non-state actors<sup>13</sup>. Meanwhile, the example of Argentina highlights the fact that the multi-stakeholder approach can be an integral part of the development of climate planning<sup>14</sup>.



## The impact of coalitions on climate issues is difficult to assess

Although some studies attempt to estimate the contribution of multi-stakeholder coalitions in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, their ambitions are too low to be part of a trajectory to limit global warming to below +2°C<sup>15</sup>. Above all, their actual contributions are difficult to measure. To ensure the compatibility of multi-stakeholder coalitions with the Paris Agreement, they must be monitored and evaluated. However, few of them take part in this exercise. Beyond these questions is that of the legitimacy of coalitions vis-à-vis States.

Therefore, the present overview attempts to answer the following questions: What contributions do they promise, but also what risks do they present? What is their role in international climate governance? How do we ensure that they keep their commitments and are accountable? These aspects are approached from three perspectives: the objectives and members of the coalitions, their governance and evaluation, and their relations with States and the UN world.

The image features a central text block surrounded by several concentric, incomplete circles in various shades of blue. Small blue dots are placed at the ends of these circular segments, creating a sense of motion or a network. The overall design is clean and modern.

**diversified an  
heterogeneous  
coalitions:  
for better or  
for worse?**



# 1. **Diversified themes and activities, but often vague and unambitious objectives**

Our analysis of the activities, themes, and objectives covered by the coalitions shows that there is duplication of effort and unclear objectives. These mixed results contrast with the declared ambitions of the multi-stakeholder coalitions that should, in theory, be supporting implementation of national climate action.

**GRAPH 2 :**  
**THEMES COVERED BY THE**  
**MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COALITIONS**  
 (GENERAL DATABASE, 321 COALITIONS)  
 EACH THEME IS COVERED BY AT LEAST 5 COALITIONS.

Emission reductions  
 and cross-cutting  
 issues as main  
 themes of work

According to the data from the selected platforms that list these coalitions, the 321 multi-stakeholder coalitions analyzed cover a wide variety of themes related to climate action (39 in total). There is a clear predominance regarding greenhouse gas emission reductions<sup>6</sup>: 57% of the coalitions directly aspire to reduce them in a specific area such as agriculture, land use/forestry, energy, or transport. Several coalitions are also committed to reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and sometimes other greenhouse gases in several sectors (11.5%).

Another noteworthy aspect is the strong representation of cross-cutting themes, such as climate finance and sustainability of municipalities and local territories (Graph 2). Indeed, subnational actors are very active within multi-stakeholder spaces. Theoretically, their participation should enable the local level to be better taken into account in the ecological transition or in the initiative. Few coalitions have specific adaptation-related themes as their main objectives. This can be explained by the structural imbalance in the treatment of adaptation issues under the UNFCCC. Direct reduction of greenhouse gas emissions has been the top priority of States and the United Nations (UN) because of the ease of calculating the cost of the measures implemented and their impacts.




## Activities ranging from conducting exchanges to implementing concrete projects and influencing public policies

Coalitions cover a wide range of activities, and most carry out two or three different ones. Of the 107 coalitions working in the specific sectors of this publication (Agriculture, Land Use and Forestry, and Energy), the 3 most recurrent activities are organization of exchanges and dialogues (85%, or 91 coalitions), generation of expertise through publications or consultation sessions (83%, or 89 coalitions), and awareness raising (74%, or 79 coalitions). The activities therefore fall mainly in the field of “soft power”, which corresponds to the primary definition of multi-stakeholder coalitions.

At the same time, some of them are moving towards implementation of actions. Concrete projects are implemented by 50%, and fundraising is organized by 25%. In addition, many of them have political impact, particularly through advocacy strategies or strategies to influence public policies (42%) (Graph 3). For example, some are creating working groups on installing “favorable environment policies”; these meet to exchange knowledge on current laws and policy frameworks, or they attempt to bolster or weaken those laws or policy frameworks, depending on their objectives.

**GRAPH 3 :**  
TYPES OF ACTIVITIES OF MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COALITIONS  
(SPECIFIC DATABASE, 107 COALITIONS)



## Objectives that are often vague and lacking in ambition

While coalitions cover a wide range of activities, the quality of their objectives is crucial to achieving their promises. Of the 107 coalitions analyzed, only 35% have both qualitative and quantitative objectives as well as a set time frame<sup>17</sup>. Yet, these three aspects provide essential information for assessing the effectiveness of the initiatives carried out. For example, the objective of the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves coalition is clear: “*The Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves seeks to mobilize high-level national and donor commitments toward the goal of universal adoption of clean cookstoves and fuels. Its ambitious but achievable 10-year goal is to foster the adoption of clean cookstoves and fuels in 100 million households by 2020*”<sup>18</sup>.

However, more than half (54%) of the objectives of the coalitions are qualitative only. For example, the Oil & Gas Methane Partnership sub-initiative (part of the Climate and Clean Air Coalition initiative) has set itself the following goal: “*To reduce methane emissions*”<sup>19</sup>. This vague objective is not conducive to transparency or to proper monitoring of the initiative. Its goal is debatable, given the climate emergency and the need to drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, a date that is not mentioned at all. In addition, 11% of coalitions incorporate either a time frame or a quantitative aspect.

## A plethora of coalitions leading to duplication of effort

In theory, coalitions should be providing extra advantages to climate action, along with a cross-cutting approach, diversity, and dynamism<sup>20</sup>. However, as the number of coalitions has grown, there has come to be duplication of efforts and overlap. Firstly, a single actor can become involved in several similar coalitions. This way, companies can commit themselves to a single objective within two similar coalitions

without increasing their contribution to the climate. For example, Total has a presence in both the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative and the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association, which appear to be strikingly similar.

Secondly, overlap can be found in themes and objectives.

**TABLE 1 :**  
EXAMPLE OF OVERLAP BETWEEN TWO COALITIONS  
IN THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR.

THE HIGHLIGHTED PASSAGES REPRESENT SIMILAR THEMES  
AND DEMONSTRATE THE RISKS OF DUPLICATION OF EFFORTS.

| COALITION   | COALITION  |
|---|--|
| <b>4/1000</b>   | <b>Global Alliance for Climate Smart Agriculture</b>   |
| <b>OBJECTIVE</b>  | <b>OBJECTIVE</b>   |
| The goal of the Initiative is to engage stakeholders in a transition towards a <b>productive, resilient</b> agriculture, based on a sustainable soil management and <b>generating jobs and incomes</b> , hence ensuring sustainable development <sup>21</sup> . | GACSA's vision is to improve food security, nutrition and <b>resilience in the face of climate change</b> . GACSA aims to catalyze and help create <b>transformational partnerships</b> to encourage actions that reflect an integrated approach to the three pillars of CSA (Climate Smart Agriculture). GACSA works towards three aspirational outcomes to: Improve <b>farmers' agricultural productivity</b> and <b>incomes</b> in a sustainable way; <b>build farmers' resilience to extreme weather and changing climate</b> ; reduce greenhouse gas emissions associated with agriculture, when possible <sup>22</sup> . |
| <b>FRENCH ACTORS</b>  | <b>FRENCH ACTORS</b>   |
| <b>French State, Danone</b>   | <b>French State, Danone</b>  |

The French State and Danone are represented in these two coalitions (Table 1). A comparison of the objectives of these coalitions reveals clear similarities. While it is possible that the activities carried out may be different, this information

is not available on the platforms. Beyond the risk of losing effectiveness or coherence in their action by engaging in more than one coalition, such overlap raises the question of the motives of certain actors to be part of coalitions.

## 2. **Over-representation of States and companies**

Lack of available data is a real obstacle to assessing how types of actors, sectors, and and how geographical contexts are represented in decision-making bodies and in coalition activities.

## An assessment difficult to determine, with incomplete data

It is difficult to establish a classification of the members of coalitions across the UN and OPS platforms. Besides the coalitions that provide no information on their members (4 coalitions out of 107), some categories of actors used by the platforms are too broad to allow precise classification, as seen by the categories “Others” or “Organizations”. The classification of “umbrella” coalitions makes classification even more complicated, because these give the names of the

coalitions that form it, without mentioning the active members. In addition, categorization is sometimes inconsistent on the UN platforms. In the Non-governmental Organizations category, we sometimes find State agencies such as *Agence Française de Développement*, UN agencies such as UNEP, or the World Bank. On the OPS website, there are coalitions for which actors are not listed at all or that are listed in a non-exhaustive manner.


## Over-representation of States and companies, far ahead of civil society and local communities

In view of the inaccuracy of the data, the figures presented below should be qualified. However, they can highlight certain trends.

The actors most often represented are States (54% of the 107 coalitions) and companies (50%). Represented at low-

er rates are NGOs (33%) and banks and investors (29%) (Graph 4). This finding is regrettable, as the presence and leading role of NGOs in a coalition can be a factor of success and guarantees greater transparency<sup>23</sup>.

**GRAPH 4 :**  
THE TYPES OF ACTORS OF MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COALITIONS  
(SPECIFIC DATABASE, 107 COALITIONS)




Other types of actors are even less represented: actors from the research world, local communities, and indigenous groups. Some vulnerable population groups, such as women or youth, are rarely mentioned as stakeholders. In our research sectors, subnational actors are also represented at a relatively low rate (11%); however, they are much more represented in other themes (cross-cutting themes, transport, sustainable municipalities and territories or urban development).

Out of all the coalitions analyzed (321), only 18% bring together four different types of actors. On the other hand, 52% (167 coalitions) include only one or two types of actors: 22% of them include only companies, and 10% include companies and banks/investors. Companies are therefore well represented in these “mono” or “duo”-stakeholder coalitions, alongside States (15% of coalitions made up of only States). This figure is almost on par with that of subnational actors (14%). NGOs, on the other hand, are grouped together in

only 8% of the 167 coalitions, and investors and banks in 5% of the coalitions.

Overall, of the total number of coalitions (321), 70% conduct activities internationally, and 18% focus on developing and least developed countries. These figures are not very representative, given that the information on the tracking platforms is rarely complete. On the UNEP platform website<sup>24</sup>, 113 coalitions are registered in Europe and North America, compared to 97 in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. In this case, the gap is not striking. However, the ClimateSouth’s report<sup>25</sup> shows the lack of balance between the rates at which developed and developing country actors are represented in coalitions (Graph 5). An in-depth study on the geographical origin of the members of multi-stakeholder coalitions and on their role in the decision-making process, in operations, and in the development of expertise in the activities of the coalitions would be a better way to illustrate the dynamics of how stakeholders are represented.

**GRAPH 5 :**  
 PARTICIPANTS IN COALITIONS, BY GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGINE  
 EXCERPT FROM THE CLIMATESOUTH REPORT 2018, P. 13.



### **3. Risks of State withdrawal, greenwashing, or contradictions with the Paris Agreement**

When society's stakeholders are insufficiently represented, and also when objectives lack ambition, multi-stakeholder coalitions present two major risks. The first is State withdrawal. The second is that of conflicts of interest arising and solutions that are not environmentally friendly being promoted.

Coalitions can in fact enable actors to implement common strategies to greenwash their communication, without transforming their activities.



## The risk of State withdrawal, especially by developed countries

The increase in the number of multi-stakeholder spaces increases the risk that States use them to shirk their responsibilities. This phenomenon, often highlighted by developing countries<sup>26</sup>, shifts the historical responsibility for climate change from developed countries to multi-stakeholder coalitions. For developed countries, promoting actions carried out within the framework of coalitions can mask the current inadequacy of their commitments, at both the national and UN levels, to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement.

In the agricultural sector, for example, we can note the contrast between the dynamics observed in the UNFCCC and that of multi-stakeholder coalitions. Indeed, while many States become involved in coalitions working toward a sustainable agricultural system, many have long refused to include the agricultural sector into the UNFCCC negotiations via the *Koronivia* program. Today, this program remains a space for discussion, whereas it should take on a real role in guiding national agricultural policies<sup>27</sup>.

## Risks of greenwashing and unraveling public policies

The theoretical advantage of multi-stakeholder coalitions is to facilitate dialog between pioneering actors and other various actors that are not used to collaborating or promoting good practices. In reality, the objective of some coalitions may be counterproductive to the ecological transition. In the sectors under study, we have noted that almost a third (36 in total) of the coalitions promote practices that are potentially in contradiction with the principles of the Paris Agreement. And with just over half of the 321 coalitions consisting of only one or two types of actors, there is a great risk that they promote practices that correspond solely to their economic interests. An example of this type of case is the LCTPI Climate Smart Agriculture sub-initiative, made up of only 10 companies, with no farmers represented in its decision-making bodies. On the same topic of climate-smart agriculture and climate, the DeSIRA initiative promotes practices that are often sources of debt for farmers, based on the use of equipment that promotes large-scale intensive agriculture<sup>28</sup>. In addition, such coalitions may harbor some actors who

have an advocacy strategy that is not aligned with the Paris agreement. The example of Total's involvement in the Sustainable Biomaterials / RSB Standard coalition illustrates this risk: the coalition issues certifications and tools concerning sustainable use of biomass and bio/agro fuels. In addition to the fact that agrofuels are widely recognized as harmful to the climate, Total's commitment to better regulation of agrofuels in this coalition seems contradictory<sup>29</sup>. Indeed, as explained in the report by Les Amis de la Terre (Friends of the Earth) on multinational lobbying<sup>30</sup>, the oil group is seeking to develop agrofuels in its La Mède refinery that do not respect the regulations set by French Members of Parliament, who want to limit palm oil imports. A double standard therefore seems to apply for some companies: support for coalitions proposing environmental measures and creation of their own certification tools on the one hand, and an active lobby to hinder them at the national level on the other.



**accountability  
and governance  
the Achilles' heel  
of coalitions**

# 1. **Accountability and governance: the Achilles' heel of coalitions**

Multi-stakeholder coalitions have various governance tools at their disposal: a secretariat, a decision-making body, annual reports, etc. However, it is unfortunate to note that, in the light of the information available, only about 12% of coalitions implement clear governance. In addition, 68% of them do not provide information on possible monitoring or evaluation tools and therefore do not allow for a proper assessment of their impact.

## The various governance tools available to a coalition

Coalitions often operate under a traditional governance structure with a secretariat, which coordinates the coalition, a decision-making body (executive committee or board) and members in working groups. A permanent secretariat or support team can be key factors in the strength of a coalition<sup>31</sup>. In addition, an operating charter and other governance documents (meeting notes, action plan, etc.) provide for the coalition’s transparency. A specific information space for each coalition allows for better communication, especially when it has a website. Of the coalitions analyzed, 68.5% have a dedicated website. That said, the mere fact of having a website does not mean that its content is detailed enough to evaluate the work it does. Finally, quality governance re-

quires tracking and monitoring of activities in detail, with an evaluation of results. This should be reflected in activity reports and financial statements, project monitoring, as well as in the publication of this information on the monitoring platforms established by the UN spaces. Finally, an essential point of governance is to ensure that the coalition’s decisions are well aligned with the Paris Agreement, consistent with guidelines such as the Sustainable Development Goals. On the basis of these different aspects, the present overview has determined four levels of governance, from “clear” to “unreported”<sup>32</sup>, according to the information provided by the coalitions on the UN and OPS platforms (see Annex 1).


## Insufficient governance weakens the legitimacy of actions.

Most coalitions still have a lot of work to do in terms of governance. Of the 321 coalitions analyzed, 13% were identified as having clear governance, 11% with acceptable governance, 4.6% with insufficient governance and 19% with no information on their governance reported (Graph 6). It is also interesting to note that 80% of coalitions with insufficient or non-reported governance were created before 2018. The weakness of their governance cannot therefore be attributed to a recent date of creation, but rather to a structur-

al operations problem.

This graph also includes coalitions registered as such but which 1) in view of their governance, projects, campaigns or public statements are hardly compatible with how a coalition works, or 2) do not have their own governance and belong to an umbrella coalition (e.g. are a sub-initiative). In this regard, we note that the format of “sub-initiatives” does not help in understanding how a coalition works, but rather reinforces the opacity of their governance.

**GRAPH 6 :**  
MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COALITIONS’ GOVERNANCE  
(GENERAL DATABASE, 321 COALITIONS)



## Illustrations of “clear” and “unreported” governance

Mission Innovation is a coalition led by States in partnership with other multi-stakeholder coalitions and international organizations. It is a good example of the minimum information a coalition should provide regarding its governance<sup>33</sup>.

Thanks to the information provided on the UNEP platform, we can identify the different bodies of this coalition (secretariat, executive committee, action plan, charter), and how they are organized and coordinated (Table 2).

**TABLE 2 :**  
EXAMPLE OF CLEAR GOVERNANCE REPORTED  
ON THE CLIMATE INITIATIVE PLATFORM

### Secretariat<sup>34</sup>

“Head of Secretariat, Jennie Dodson:

Jennie.Dodson@beis.gov.uk

Jennie.Dodson@beis.gov.uk. The Mission Innovation (MI) Secretariat provides a stable, long-term resource to drive forward MI activities and achieve the vision and impact described in the Enabling Framework and the Action Plan through the use of collaborative, transparent and creative approaches.

All Secretariat functions and tasks are delivered in close consultation and through recommendations from the MI Steering Committee. Activities include:

- Supporting the MI Steering Committee (MISC), members and the MI Sub-Groups with the advice, evidence and structures to work effectively together to deliver tangible outcomes.
- Delivering the tools that enable the whole initiative to maximise the impacts of its activities including through communications, knowledge brokering and building coalitions.
- Tracking progress towards the delivery of the Action Plan, developing new initiatives that raise ambition, and generating excitement around emerging innovations.

### Organizational structure<sup>35</sup>

“High-level leadership is provided by MI members’ Ministers with responsibility for clean energy innovation. The MI Steering

Committee, comprised of member representatives, provides strategic guidance to foster implementation of MI’s Enabling Framework. Core administrative functions are carried out by the MI Secretariat, supporting the Steering Committee.

Three MI Sub-Groups carry out specific tasks:

- Analysis and Joint Research: Mobilizes the collective knowledge, capabilities and resources of members to maximize impact across eight technology areas, known as Innovation Challenges, which MI members have identified as critical to address climate change.
- Business and Investor Engagement: Assists MI members in identifying opportunities and engaging the private sector.
- Ministerial Planning Team: Provides strategic and diplomatic oversight for the annual MI Ministerial. The MI Steering Committee is currently led by the United Kingdom”

This type of example of quality information is, however, too rare. A majority of the coalitions are similar to the New Vision for Agriculture coalition<sup>36</sup>, which provides very little information on its governance: it includes only the number of members, the first four flagship partnerships and a men-

tion of the World Economic Forum, which seems to lead the coalition. However, it does not disclose information about its governance bodies or the role or names of coalition members.

## **2. Insufficient assessment of the impact of coalitions**

Similar to the lack of reporting on governance, too few coalitions (27%) report on their monitoring and evaluation system on the coalition platforms. Yet, there is no shortage of monitoring and evaluation tools, whose use is crucial for ensuring coalition accountability.

## A disappointing finding: too many coalitions do not communicate on their monitoring and evaluation tools

Our findings clearly reveal that, of the 321 coalitions studied, more than two-thirds (68%) do not provide information on their monitoring and evaluation tools<sup>37</sup>. There are nonetheless 27% of the coalitions that clearly detail their monitoring and evaluation tools (e.g. their annual report or commitment tracker, etc.), and 5% can be characterized as having an insufficient monitoring system limited to some information on certain activities carried out, without details or concrete measures of their impact (e.g. in terms of reduction of greenhouse gas emissions) (Graph 7).

However, there are different ways of monitoring and evaluating the impact of coalitions. As far as internal evaluation is concerned, one thing that all coalitions can do is to verify that their planned activities are implemented properly, according to set timetables and objectives.

Impact evaluation is more complicated. Several studies at-

tempt, for example, to calculate it in terms of greenhouse gas emission reductions. This is the case of UNEP, which estimates that the emissions reductions generated by the action of non-state actors (and therefore coalitions) will amount to almost 3 Gt CO<sub>2</sub>e in 2020, taking into account overlap among initiatives<sup>38</sup>. In other words, if the multi-stakeholder coalitions really implemented their commitments, they would contribute to aligning with a +2°C warming scenario<sup>39</sup>. However, in the absence of a systematic and coherent evaluation of activities within each coalition, it is difficult to verify the reality of this estimate.

Finally, impact assessment cannot be confined to promises to reduce emissions. It must also include impact in terms of knowledge building and political influence (advocacy, exchange and research, awareness raising, etc.).

**GRAPH 7 :**  
MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COALITIONS  
(GENERAL DATABASE, 321 COALITIONS)



### Some concrete examples

Reporting is not practiced systematically within coalitions, and, when it is done, it is not always comprehensive. For example, the Powering Past Coal Alliance did not fill in the boxes in front of the follow-up questions on the UN platforms<sup>40</sup>. Some coalitions fill out only half of the forms, in particular information on their objectives and types of activities. Questions about monitoring, such as the system for evaluating objectives or the latest coalition results, etc., are rarely answered. Very few coalitions provide figures measuring their impacts.

But it is possible to provide all this information, as demon-

strated by the Mission Innovation (MI) coalition's entry on the UNEP platform, where we can read various explanations including "The 'Tracking Progress' work stream of Mission is led by the MI Secretariat with the aim of assessing progress towards achieving the goals set out in the MI Action Plan and the Delivering the Action Plan 2018-2020 document."<sup>41</sup>, or "Progress towards achieving the goals set out in the MI Action Plan is tracked through an annual survey circulated among MI members. The information included in these surveys is then analysed and used to draft the 'MI Impact Review' report." with a link to the latest survey<sup>42</sup>.

## States and UN spaces as the only actors capable of requiring monitoring and evaluation from coalitions

Only legitimate political spaces can resolve the issue of accountability of non-state actors and multi-stakeholder coalitions. As the MSI Integrity study demonstrates, coalitions are not a binding entity for holding their actors, including companies, accountable<sup>43</sup>. Both the UN and States have the responsibility to oversee the accountability of coalitions. By

being members or even donors, States can provide better technical and/or financial support to coalitions to establish quality governance and better monitoring. They should support only cross-sectoral and transformative coalitions and withdraw from those not compatible with the Paris Agreement.

# The French government and big French companies in multi-stakeholder coalitions

As mentioned above, the French government is very proactive in multi-stakeholder spaces. French private non-state actors also often have a presence in coalitions. In our research target (107 coalitions), France is present as a member and/or funder in 28% of them. This figure rises to 46% for

French companies.

Looking more closely at French companies and specific research sectors, we see that six coalitions include participation by ENGIE, six by Total and eight by Danone (Table 3).

**TABLE 3 :**  
THE COALITIONS IN WHICH ENGIE, TOTAL, AND DANONE ARE MEMBERS  
(SPECIFIC DATABASE, 107 COALITIONS)

| Engie                                       | Total  | Danone   |
|---|--|--|
| 1. Alliance for an Energy Efficient Economy | 1. Breakthrough Energy coalition   | 1. 4/1000  |
| 2. Breakthrough Energy coalition            | 2. CCAC : Oil & Gas Methane Partnership                                    | 2. Climate Smart Agriculture Booster             |
| 3. Cool coalition                           | 3. Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership                                | 3. Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture |
| 4. Global CCS Institute                     | 4. International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association | 4. RE100 Initiative                              |
| 5. Powering Past Coal Alliance              | 5. Oil and Gas Climate Initiative  | 5. Remove commodity-driven deforestation         |
| 6. Renewable Energy Buyers Alliance         | 6. Sustainable Biomaterials / RSB Standard                                 | 6. Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil            |
|   |  | 7. Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform   |
|   |  | 8. Palm Oil Innovation Group                     |

It is interesting to note that the company ENGIE is involved outside of France in renewable energy and energy efficiency, through such coalitions as the Alliance for an Energy Efficient Economy (active in India) and the Renewable Energy Buyers Alliance (active in the United States). Yet, according to Greenpeace's green electricity guide<sup>44</sup>, ENGIE remains one of the most polluting French electricity suppliers, particularly via exploration and exploitation of new fossil fuel deposits. Moreover, in June 2019, the company opened a new coal-fired power plant in Chile, in the city of Mejillones<sup>45</sup>. This inconsistency can also be seen in the case of other companies, for example Danone. Despite this multinational's commitment in coalitions for more sustainable agriculture, its due-diligence plan concerning respect for human rights and the environment remains incomplete, limited and

vague<sup>46</sup>. Its internal organization is thus not consistent with its external commitments.

For France, a preliminary remark consists in pointing out that the list of coalitions below, drawn up on the basis of the UN and OPS platforms, contains errors noted after exchanges with the Ministry of Energy Transition (office of climate change and energy management) and the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs (sub-directorate of environment and climate). For example, France does not, or no longer, take part in coalitions 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18 and 30. These errors show how important it is to establish a complete and strict follow-up with the multi-stakeholder coalitions and a regular update of the census platforms. In addition, this list concerns the specific research sectors of agriculture and energy (Table 4)<sup>47</sup>.

**TABLE 4 :**  
THE COALITIONS IN WHICH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS A MEMBER  
(SPECIFIC DATABASE, 107 COALITIONS)

|   |   |  |
|---|---|--|
| 1. 4/1000   | 11. Climate Smart Agriculture Booster                         | 21. IEA Technology Collaboration Programme on Energy Efficient End-Use Equipment |
| 2. Accelerating Renewable Energy Transition in SIDS | 12. Cool coalition  | 22. International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation                  |
| 3. African Renewable Energy Initiative              | 13. Development Smart Initiative for Research in Agriculture  | 23. International Solar Alliance   |
| 4. Breakthrough Energy Coalition                    | 14. Energy Cities   | 24. Land Degradation Neutrality Fund   |
| 5. Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum            | 15. Forest Carbon Partnership Facility                        | 25. Mission Innovation   |
| 6. Clean Energy Ministerial                         | 16. Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture             | 26. New York Declaration on Forests  |
| 7. Central African Forests Initiative               | 17. Global Bioenergy Partnership                              | 27. Powering Past Coal Alliance  |
| 8. Central American Integration System Initiative   | 18. Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership                  | 28. Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership                           |
| 9. Clean Energy Corridors in Africa                 | 19. Global Geothermal Alliance                                | 29. SIDS Lighthouse initiative   |
| 10. CCAC : Oil & Gas Methan Partnership             | 20. Global Research Alliance on Agricultural Greenhouse Gases | 30. Zero Routine Flaring by 2030   |



Despite these data errors, it is also interesting to highlight three other points concerning France's involvement in coalitions. Firstly, of the 30 coalitions, one-third cover regions in developing countries. It therefore seems that France uses coalitions as a tool for international actions and diplomacy. Secondly, only two coalitions have clear governance (excluding sub-initiatives) and use a monitoring and evaluation system (the Global Research Alliance on Agricultural Greenhouse Gases and Mission Innovation). France should encourage,

within the coalitions to which it belongs, the establishment of clear governance and the monitoring of action effectiveness, and it should withdraw from coalitions that are reluctant to evaluate their impact. Finally, it is interesting to note that France is committed internationally in areas where it is far from exemplary at home. For example, it is present in many coalitions on renewable energy, even though it does not meet its 2020 national target of 23% renewable energy (its share is 17.2% of the French energy mix in 2020)<sup>48</sup>.

## The One Planet Summit: still a long way to go on the path to evaluation

OPS is a platform for commitments for a low carbon economy for all types of actors. It was launched in 2017 by President Emmanuel Macron, as well as by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and World Bank President Jim Kim. Annual summits have been held since then, but lack of rigorous follow-up has led to a lack of clarity about what its initiatives actually implement. With successive summits having been the focus of strong media attention and having attracted many high-level stakeholders and political decision-makers,

we can wonder how intensely this type of event competes with the COPs (the Conferences of the Parties on international climate negotiations), which sometimes have difficulty attracting Heads of State and Government. Classifying the 29 coalitions present at the One Planet Summit<sup>49</sup> according to their level of communication on governance and monitoring/evaluation<sup>50</sup> shows us the lack of reporting on these aspects within this space (Table 5).

**TABLE 5 :**  
EVALUATION AND MONITORING IN OPS COALITIONS  
ALL COALITIONS ON ITS WEBSITE AS OF JULY 1, 2020)

|                                  | CLEAR MONITORING/ EVALUATION | INSUFFICIENT MONITORING/ EVALUATION  | MONITORING/ EVALUATION NOT REPORTED   | TOTAL     |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------|--|---|-----------|
| CLEAR GOVERNANCE                 | 0                            | 0  | International Development Finance Club<br>Transport Decarbonization Alliance  | 2         |
| ACCEPTABLE GOVERNANCE            | 0                            | 0  | 0   | 0         |
| INSUFFICIENT GOVERNANCE          |                              | Global Urbis<br>One Planet Sovereign Wealth Fund<br>International Solar Alliance   | Powering Past Coal Alliance   | 4         |
| GOVERNANCE UNREPORTED            | 0                            | Initiative Make our Planet Great Again<br>InvestEU Program<br>Land Degradation Neutrality Fund<br>Observatoire spatial du climat One Planet<br>Fellowship Program<br>Paris Collaborative on Green Budgeting<br>Plateforme de financement 100 projets «Eau et Climat» pour l'Afrique<br>Sustainable India Finance Facility - Zero Budget Natural Farming<br>Towards Carbon Neutrality<br>Tropical Landscape Finance Facility<br>Climate Action 100+ | Breakthrough Energy Coalition<br>Carbon Neutrality Coalition<br>Carbon Pricing for the Americas<br>Caribbean Climate-Smart Accelerator<br>Task force for philanthropy innovation<br>European Solidarity Corps<br>DESIRA<br>Greening the Financial System<br>Pacific Initiative for Climate and Biodiversity<br>Task-Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure | 21        |
| SUB-INITIATIVE / NOT A COALITION | 0                            | One Planet Charter   | European initiative for coal regions in transition  | 2         |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                     | <b>0</b>                     | <b>15</b>  | <b>14</b>   | <b>29</b> |

None of the coalitions has provided, on that platform, sufficient information on how it operates internally or on its monitoring and evaluation. This puts into question the legitimacy of their actions. France should use this multi-stakeholder platform to urge the member coalitions to set up a

comprehensive monitoring system and report on both that system and their governance system. It could require that all the OPS coalitions provide full information on the UN and OPS platforms, to allow real monitoring of their activities and avoid "greenwashing".



implementation  
tools, not  
substitutes  
for states and  
the UNFCCC

# 1. The UNFCCC system for supervising coalitions is inadequate.

Non-state action is encouraged by the UNFCCC and the UN. However, in practice, there is no monitoring or evaluation of the impact of that action. Despite the activities and publications of the MPGCA (Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action), a space dedicated to coalitions and non-state actors, and the creation of the Global Climate Action portal, the UN system has many limitations. Nonetheless, currently the UNFCCC seems to be the only body with the capacity and legitimacy to coordinate climate goals between States and non-state actors.

## Supervision based on volunteered information

According to the UNFCCC, the dynamism of non-state actors and coalitions encourages States both to make their NDCs more ambitious and to work together more with all actors in society to achieve their climate goals. According to Lukas Hermwille, the UNFCCC favors a collaborative and rather neo-liberal approach to dialog, to avoid confrontation and blockages. This multilateralism, which is in theory more open and less based on constraint, has been the order of the day, particularly since the failure of the Copenhagen COP15<sup>1</sup>.

Today, the UNFCCC uses two monitoring systems, starting with the Global Climate Action portal, which it created in 2014. This portal is supposed to address the issue of transparency among non-state actors and coalitions. In addition, UNEP also has its own platform (the Climate Initiatives Platform), which works in collaboration with the UNFCCC. Both platforms use the same database and the same form to be filled in by coalitions. Although the questions on monitoring

and governance should be more detailed, this form appears to be quite comprehensive and does provide for a description of the coalition's governance, its monitoring and evaluation tools, its membership, its activities, and its objectives. However, filling in this form is still optional for the coalitions, thereby diminishing the relevance of both platforms. In reality, most coalitions fill in only one part of the information. In addition, information is rarely updated and is therefore sometimes contradictory to that on the coalitions' websites. On the UNFCCC portal, the form does not appear at all for the viewer, so there is no visibility regarding the questions asked to the coalitions and those they did not answer. The UNEP platform's display model allows for more transparency in this respect, as it mentions the categories (but without information). Generally speaking, it would be desirable for the two platforms to operate according to the same model, or even to be merged in order to become the multi-stakeholder climate and environment platform of the UN world.

## A space that is not very integrated into the negotiation spaces

The principle of accountability is not championed enough in UN multi-stakeholder spaces. The UNFCCC reflects the dynamics of international negotiations, and thus depends on the willingness of States to make this permanent but intergovernmental body a versatile and efficient tool. For the time being, the UNFCCC is structured according to a unilateral approach: it tries to identify and give visibility to climate action and coalitions, but gives little feedback on the impact of this action (by the coalitions) in the negotiation processes. This creates a disconnection between negotiation spaces of State and non-state actors. However, there is a space within the UNFCCC that organizes discussions and the integration of non-state actors in its processes: the MPGCA. The MPGCA publishes an annual *Yearbook of Climate Action*: while not a real assessment, it presents the good practices of multi-sector coalitions, thanks to the information made available on the Global Climate Action portal. It is also the MPGCA that leads discussions on this monitoring platform. However, the MPGCA space has its limits: neither it nor its publications/events are consulted very much by States. Its

visibility usually boils down to a few events during the COPs; these tend to be celebratory or communication events more than a real analysis of the actions implemented by the coalitions and their impact. In addition, several types of actors are insufficiently included into the MPGCA discussions, such as civil society and local communities, particularly from developing countries.

The start of the implementation phase of the Paris Agreement and the growing number of multi-stakeholder coalitions raise several questions, in particular about the role of the UNFCCC as an institution for centralizing effective monitoring of non-state action. Why would it not define, for example through the work of the MPGCA team, not only strict criteria for monitoring, but also exclusion criteria for coalitions that encourage practices not in line with the Paris Agreement? Faced with these problems, States have not, to date, given the UNFCCC a mandate to evaluate coalitions. Moreover, as things stand, it is also clear that the UNFCCC does not have the human and financial resources to carry out such work.

**2.**  
**The need to better  
define the role  
of coalitions in the  
implementation  
of the NDCs**

## The benefits of coordination, exchange and collective messages

Non-state actors have an important role to play in the context of NDCs<sup>52</sup>. They must participate in the implementation of the Paris Agreement locally and contribute their expertise in the field. Their coming together in multi-stakeholder coalitions can act as an effective tool for coordinating actions and exchanging good practices. This can thus act as support for the State in the implementation of its climate policy. Coalitions can help deliver strong and collective messages of climate ambition<sup>53</sup>. For example, the Powering Past Coal Alliance is calling on OECD and European Union member states to stop using coal for electric power generation by 2030 at the latest. These coalitions count on having a knock-on effect: States lacking ambition may, upon receiving messages from non-state actors, be led to implement more ambitious policies and measures, which in turn lead other non-state

actors into the ecological transition<sup>54</sup>.

Coalitions can also give alerts on lack of governance or regulation in an area. Their contributions thus help the State to better regulate and legislate<sup>55</sup>, particularly on the issue of land management, forest protection, and the integration of renewable energies into the national energy mix and electricity networks. The International Solar Alliance coalition has enabled developing countries, in particular India, to train engineering experts and policy makers to include solar energy into their power grids and climate strategies<sup>56</sup>. However, in reality, there are few cases illustrating these advantages, either because of a lack of information and transparency on coalitions or because of a lack of consistency with the principles of the Paris Agreement.

## Risks of overlap between the commitments of States and coalitions

There is notable risk of overlap between a coalition's impact (on greenhouse gases or other) and a State's climate action. For example, the contributions of a coalition can be considered as additional to State contributions when in actuality they are the result of a public policy. This may lead to emission reductions made by the coalition and by the NDC to be counted twice. This is all the more damaging when there is no systematic feedback between coalition action and increase in ambition of the NDCs.

Several studies have attempted to calculate the scale of impact overlap between the multi-stakeholder coalitions and NDCs: it could reach 70% in 2020 and 80% in 2030<sup>57</sup>. These figures show that most multi-stakeholder coalitions cover the same sectors or geographical areas as NDCs, and there-

fore overlap with national objectives. In its report<sup>58</sup>, the Initiative for Climate Action Transparency coalition indicates the possibility of total overlap between a national policy and a coalition. In this case, the coalition's contribution is therefore not additional, it simply applies national law/regulation.

The overlap may also be partial. For example, when the ambitions of a coalition's objectives exceed those of the State in which it is located. In this case, the contribution of the coalition is considered to be additional to that of national policy. If this is indeed the case, the contribution of the coalition should be taken into account by States concerned, so that they can raise the ambition of their NDCs<sup>59</sup>.

## The State as a legitimate and competent political space

The question of the political legitimacy of these coalitions remains. While it is clear that all stakeholders must work to combat climate change, the action of companies, universities or trade unions cannot replace the regulatory and prescriptive role of the State (and also to some extent that of local authorities). This regulatory power of the various actors makes it possible to implement structural reforms and to arbitrate between the divergent interests of non-state actors. Coalitions cannot take on a similar role, nor can they act with the same authority that is in principle democratic: governments/heads of state are elected and given a mandate; this is not the case for the other actors that make up the coalitions.

The case of the United States is instructive in this respect: following Donald Trump's announcement of withdraw-

al from the Paris Agreement, the "We are still in" coalition has undertaken to implement the measures that will make it possible to comply with the objective set out in the NDC of the United States<sup>60</sup>. However, these actors do not have the legitimacy to revise the level of ambition of the contribution, which remains far too low, or to adopt all the regulations that would make it possible to achieve the objectives. The role of the State, in setting the ambition of the climate objectives and in establishing policies and guidelines to meet them, is therefore paramount.

It is for this reason—and to prevent certain actors from positioning their particular or economic interests in what they call climate measures—that the State must maintain its role as the main regulator of climate policy<sup>61</sup>. Multi-stakeholder coalitions should be limited to a support/implementation

role for climate regulations and not be a substitute for the latter.

Finally, it is worth taking a look at the impact of multi-stakeholder coalitions at the national or local level. It is obvious that the State must coordinate with subnational actors because it sometimes does not have the authority to take action at the subnational level. Action on a local scale could enable those most affected by climate change to participate, to focus on relevant national issues and to bring together all stakeholders to work together in an operational manner to achieve the objectives set by the State. As of this writing, many national multi-stakeholder coalitions exist, but they are not very visible on international platforms where they can register.

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# **3. Several ideas for improving multi- stakeholder coalition governance for the post-2020 period**



The present overview puts forward some proposals for improving the governance of multi-stakeholder coalitions for the post-2020 period. They are intended to address the main problem of the coalitions, i.e. lack of monitoring and evaluation of their impacts. Several of these proposals have been directly inspired by various studies on the subject<sup>62</sup>. After 2020:


- **The UNFCCC should be the main orchestrator in determining international climate ambitions, including coalitions. Coalitions should therefore be tools for implementing the Paris Agreement and contribute to raising the ambition of States.** The UNFCCC should have a dual role: monitoring States' climate commitments and acting as an arbitrator for multi-stakeholder initiatives. These latter can be found in various UN or non-UN spaces (Climate Action Summit, OPS, Non-State Actors Summit in California, G7 under the French presidency, etc.). While these spaces should continue to coexist, the UNFCCC should ensure that the commitments and the actions carried out in these various spaces are connected and consistent with one another.
- **The UNFCCC should monitor multi-stakeholder climate action through information to be reported regularly on the Global Climate Action portal, but also by implementing entry criteria and making sure certain red lines in terms of ambition are not crossed.** If an international multi-stakeholder coalition does not comply with this international monitoring system, it should not be recognized by the UNFCCC and should not be highlighted in the multi-stakeholder spaces of the UN. Multi-stakeholder coalitions must provide all the information currently requested on the Global Climate Action portal (on governance, membership, goals, outcomes) on an annual basis. In addition, the UNFCCC should set up platform entry criteria based on a minimum of ambition as well as on a list of certain practices that the coalitions must avoid (e.g. encouraging the oil industry, non-respect of human rights, etc.). With regard to human rights, the UNFCCC could use the Free, Informed and Prior Consent (FIPC) principles<sup>63</sup>. For this to happen, States must accept that the UNFCCC exercise a role of arbitrator over multi-stakeholder coalitions.
- **The contributions by the coalitions in terms of impact and accountability should be evaluated via the Global Climate Action portal, as a way to assess, for informational purposes, their non-state action.** The assessment should be based on four criteria: reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, transfer of financial flows for the transition, creation of resilience, and activities in the fields of advocacy and expertise building for the coalitions. The coalitions should be evaluated in terms of impacts (ad-

vocacy, increase in expertise, reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, etc.) and also in terms of accountability (whether or not objectives are achieved). The assessment could be carried out by specialized UNFCCC teams, and by calling on external experts at least every two years. If the coalition's activities—even those that are less focused, such as advocacy—are not in line with the principles of the Paris Agreement, it will have to change its objectives and/or activities, or even be excluded from UN platforms. Annual monitoring would allow the UNFCCC to verify that similar commitments of coalitions are not counted twice. These assessments could be presented during the Global Stocktake sessions and be used to fuel discussions.

- **A calculation should be made of the additional contribution by multi-stakeholder coalitions to achieving the Paris Agreement objectives, and it should be used as information to help raise the ambition of States in their NDCs.** The UNFCCC can be the link between States and coalitions working in the same sector or geographical area and support better collaboration between them. Coalitions should act as a tool available to States to facilitate the implementation of their NDCs as a complement to regulatory frameworks and coherent public policies. They can also contribute to the mechanism for raising the ambition of the Paris Agreement when implementation of actions carried out by the coalitions makes it possible to obtain additional greenhouse gas emission reductions.

A distinction must be made between the policy space, for decision-making, and that of implementation. States and the UNFCCC are the political entities with the legitimacy and capacity to regulate and legislate climate policy. To implement the State and UNFCCC guidelines, the coalitions can propose a platform for exchange and cooperation. However, they should remain operational partners of States, and not spaces for political negotiations (Graph 8). This would require a UNFCCC process to adopt a new way of operating internally, so that it could better integrate the impact of the coalitions and in particular evaluate it. Specialized teams within the UNFCCC should be responsible for monitoring multi-stakeholder coalitions and non-state actors. With a strengthening of the Global Climate Action portal and above all an obligation for coalitions to fill out all the requested information on it, these teams could gather all the information needed to establish comprehensive monitoring of coalitions and assess their additional contributions to State action. In addition, through technical meetings, they could mobilize the expertise required to reflect on the accounting methods to be implemented to avoid any risk of commitments being counted twice.

**GRAPH 8 :**  
 ILLUSTRATION OF MORE ROBUST INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE  
 FOR POST-2020 THAT INCLUDES MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COALITIONS.



The page features a decorative graphic consisting of several thick, curved lines in various colors (orange, yellow, green, blue, teal) that sweep across the page, framing the central text. Each line ends with a small colored dot.

recommendations  
from Réseau  
Action Climat  
France

## Accountability criteria to be established in multi-stakeholder coalitions

The following recommendations are intended for the coalitions and the decision-makers that manage them, who should use different criteria and principles of legitimacy to organize the way the coalitions operate internally.

- A multi-stakeholder coalition can be one implementation tool among others to achieve the climate goals set by States. It should not be a substitute for States, by which it would help make up for governments' commitments that are too weak.
- A multi-stakeholder coalition is a space for implementing objectives emanating from legitimate political spaces (States and the UN). As such, it must comply with and seek to contribute to the objectives and principles of the Paris Agreement. A multi-stakeholder coalition is neither an interest group nor a space for enabling multinational companies or other non-state actors to green their communication. Its function is not to unravel legislative and legal frameworks to protect climate, biodiversity, and the environment.
- A multi-stakeholder coalition should be part of the UN ac-

countability framework through the Global Climate Action portal, providing the requested information annually. If the objectives it has set itself meet the above criteria, it must implement them in concrete terms. The governance of a coalition should not be opaque.

- A multi-stakeholder coalition must not allow State and non-state actors to multiply similar commitments in different platforms, which leads to duplication of efforts and fragmentation of these actors.
- A multi-stakeholder coalition should bring together all the actors necessary for the ecological transition and must put the needs of vulnerable communities impacted by climate change at the heart of their decision-making. Multi-stakeholder coalitions are not a means of justifying solutions that are not in line with the principles of the Paris Agreement or projects that lead to human rights violations.
- A coalition should enable networking and collaboration among different actors to face a problem and implement common solutions.

## Relationships to be established between coalitions and States

These recommendations are intended for States and their agencies that work with multi-stakeholder coalitions.

- Multi-stakeholder coalitions are one tool among others for the implementation of the Paris Agreement. They can help in cooperation but must not allow States to conceal the inadequacy of their actions. States, which have legitimacy from a democratic point of view, must remain the core actors of climate policy and assume their political responsibility for it.
- States must better plan the development of their climate policy and the implementation of their national contributions with non-state actors. They must also enable the various stakeholders of society to take true ownership of the Paris Agreement objectives.

- States must recognize the UNFCCC, through the adoption of a formal decision (mandate), as a space for monitoring and evaluating non-state climate action, with entry and exclusion criteria. States must provide the UNFCCC the human and financial resources to perform this monitoring work.
- States must take into account the information on non-state action identified by the UNFCCC and adapt their NDCs accordingly, particularly in terms of ambition.
- Coalitions are often funded by States or State/intergovernmental agencies. The States that provide such funding should make their financial support conditional on the coalitions' compliance with the Paris Agreement objectives.

## Relationships to be supervised between coalitions and the UNFCCC

These recommendations are intended for UN diplomats and experts.

- Non-state actors have a support role in the implementation of the Paris Agreement. Their participation and involvement in the ecological transition must continue, to enable better inclusion of actors from the developing countries and regions most affected by climate change.
- The discussions held under the UNFCCC must enable the establishment of a process for monitoring and evaluating the impact of non-state actors, and thus of multi-stakeholder coalitions. The Global Climate Action portal should be strengthened, or even merged with UNEP's Climate Initiatives Platform, to avoid there being too many monitoring and evaluation spaces.
- Registration on the Global Climate Action portal should


be mandatory for a coalition for it to be able to be visible on UN spaces. The portal should be updated annually, and coalitions and actors that do not provide their information correctly should be excluded from UN spaces until full information on the platform has been obtained. Exclusion criteria must also be established: coalitions that directly or indirectly support the oil, coal, natural gas and nuclear industries must be rejected, as well as those that cause human rights violations.

- This work to better integrate and evaluate non-state actors is not only necessary for the climate field, but also for biodiversity. Better synergy should take place between the climate and biodiversity negotiating spaces, as well as between the MPGCA and the biodiversity action agenda.

## France and its duty to support a solid framework for evaluating coalitions

These recommendations are intended for the French government:

- France is present in many coalitions, where it has more or less ambitious objectives. It should focus on transparent and transformative coalitions that correspond to the criteria on page 36 and withdraw from the others.
- France is a recurring funder of multi-stakeholder coalitions. It should make its support conditional on compliance with the exclusion criteria established by the UNFCCC for multi-stakeholder coalitions (not encouraging fossil fuels, protection of human rights, transparency and compliance with the UN monitoring framework).
- France has established an international multi-stakeholder platform, the OPS, which does not have an effective monitoring and evaluation mechanism and whose initiatives are not systematically listed on the Global Climate Action portal. This situation must change quickly. The next OPS meeting will be an opportunity to endorse a robust evaluation system and the automatic registration of coalitions on the UN platform.



notes and  
references

# Notes

1. In this way, a coalition that has implemented an assessment or governance tool but has not mentioned it on UN platforms or on the OPS websites placed in the category of not having provided the information
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5. Definition according to the Global Climate Action portal: subnational authorities (cities, regions, etc.), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), companies, think tanks, universities, trade unions, etc. <https://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/about.html>, accessed on July 1, 2020.
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9. For example, through decision 1/CP.21 of 2015 (Paragraphs 118-120 and 134-137).
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13. Climate Transparency, *Brown to Green Report, 2019* (Climate Transparency, 2019).
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15. UNFCCC, *Yearbook for Global Climate Action, 2019* (UNFCCC, 2019).
16. Multi-sectoral coalitions working to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the sectors of transport, agriculture, land use and forestry, energy, renewable energy, energy efficiency.
17. Quantitative: objective with a quantified impact (e.g. number of GW reached with renewable energies).  
Time frame: target with a set date (e.g. by 2020, 2030, etc.).  
Qualitative: objective without quantification, nor a time frame. For example, providing access to clean energy (energy quality) in Africa.
18. [http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/Global\\_Alliance\\_for\\_Clean\\_Cookstoves](http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/Global_Alliance_for_Clean_Cookstoves), accessed on July 1, 2020.
19. <https://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/cooperative-initiative-details.html?id=14>, accessed on July 1, 2020.
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21. [http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/4\\_1000\\_-\\_Soils\\_for\\_Food\\_Security\\_and\\_Climate](http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/4_1000_-_Soils_for_Food_Security_and_Climate) accessed on July 1, 2020.
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25. ClimateSouth, 2018. *Cooperative climate action 2013 – 2018: Global performance and geographic scope*, German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford, the African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS), The Energy and Resources Institute, prepared by the ClimateSouth Project team of Sander Chan, Thomas Hale, Kennedy Mbeva, Manish Kumar Shrivastava, Jacopo Bencini, Victoria Chengo, Ganesh Gorti, Lukas Edbauer, Imogen Jacques, Arturo Salazar, Tim Cholibois, Debora Leao Andrade Gouveia, Jose Maria Valenzuela, Alexa Waud, Abhishek Kaushik, Kavya Michael, Mekhala Sastri, Rhea Puri, Ria Rahiman, Victor Onyango, Finney Israel, Rebecca Oloo. (Climate South 2018).
26. Chan, Falkner, Van Asselt, Goldberg, 2015.
27. Article "De la COP 25 à la COP 26 : 10 idées pour faire évoluer nos politiques agricoles", CCFD-Terre Solidaire, published on Nov. 29, 2019, <https://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/nos-combats/dereglements/cop-25-agriculture-10-idees-6487>, accessed on Sept. 29, 2020.
28. See the article "Why civil society says NO to climate-smart agriculture", updated on Feb. 6, 2019, <https://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/nos-combats/souverainete/dossier-faim-et-le-ccfd-terre-solidaire-623/pourquoi-la-societe-5201> and Réseau Action Climat's note on "climate-smart agriculture", a term used in this note: *L'agriculture de précision: un modèle aux antipodes de la transition écologique et sociale*, September 2020, <https://reseauactionclimat.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/notes-rac-agriculture-de-precision.pdf>
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30. Olivier Petitjean, *Lobbying: l'épidémie cachée*, June 2020 (Petitjean, 2020).
31. Graichen, Healy, Siemons, Höhne, Kuramochi, Gonzales-Zuñiga, Sterl, Kersting, 2016.
32. „Clear” governance implies that there is detailed information on all decision-making and coordinating bodies, with explanations on how they are linked and how they operate. “Acceptable” governance provides that detailed information, but without explanations on how they are linked and how they operate. In “insufficient” governance, only some of the coalition’s bodies are presented, and finally, “unreported” governance means there is no information on its governance. See Annex 1
33. [http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/Mission\\_Innovation](http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/Mission_Innovation), accessed on July 1, 2020
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. See [http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/New\\_Vision\\_for\\_Agriculture](http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/New_Vision_for_Agriculture), accessed on July 1, 2020.
37. In the present overview, we consider the following as monitoring and evaluation tools, depending on the coalition’s activities: a full report of activities (dates, amount and source of funding, reports or summary notes on the project or activity, participants and/or beneficiaries, objectives and outcomes), a calculation of the coalition’s impact (number of beneficiaries, reduced greenhouse gas emissions, number of events organized including number of participants, campaign impacts, number of partners having received its certification, notes from institutional advocacy meetings). See Annex 1
38. UNEP 2015.
39. NewClimate Institute, Data-Driven Lab, PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, German Development Institute/ Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, 2019.
40. See [http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/Powering\\_Past\\_Coal\\_Alliance](http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/Powering_Past_Coal_Alliance) and <https://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/cooperative-initiative-details.html?id=88>, pages accessed on July 1, 2020.
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42. Ibid.
43. MSI Integrity, Not Fit-for-Purpose: *The Grand Experiment of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives in Corporate Accountability, Human Rights and Global Governance*, 2020 (MSI Integrity, 2020).
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47. This list was drawn up using the three coalition platforms as well as the following tool: French Ministry of Ecological and Inclusive Transition, *Agenda de l'Action, un outil au service de l'accord de Paris (Action Agenda, a tool at the service of the Paris Agreement)*, October 2019 (Ministry of Ecological and Inclusive Transition, 2019).
48. Website of the Climate & Energy Observatory (<https://www.observatoire-climat-energie.fr/energie/energie-renouvelables/>), accessed on Sept. 30, 2020.
49. As mentioned in the methodology, the coalitions are considered as such because they are presented under this term by the OPS.
50. The present overview was designed using data filled in by the coalitions as of July 1, 2020. Since then, the OPS website has introduced a new tab, making it possible to view all the coalitions and check the details about each one. Today, there are just over 30 coalitions, but the information concerning them often remains incomplete and the follow-up is not detailed enough.
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55. MSI Integrity, 2020.
56. See reports and summaries of the coalition’s activities, including the following link <https://isolaralliance.org/work/projects>, accessed on Sept. 30, 2020.
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annexes

# 1. Governance and monitoring criteria

## GOVERNANCE

### CLEAR GOVERNANCE

“Clear” governance implies that details have been provided on all the coalition’s decision-making and coordinating bodies. The coalition gives details of the role of its members (especially the leadership and those who are part of its decision-making bodies) and indicates whether or not it has a dedicated coordination team. The coalition also reports on its working documents, such as a charter, an action plan, or the minutes of internal operational meetings.

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### ACCEPTABLE GOVERNANCE

“Acceptable” governance means that the coalition gives information on its decision-making and coordinating bodies, but without with explanations on how they are linked and how they operate. For example, the role of the members within the coalition’s bodies is not explained. The coalition also communicates its internal operating documents.

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### INSUFFICIENT GOVERNANCE

The governance of a coalition is “insufficient” when it indicates only some of its bodies, and only some (or none) of its internal operating documents.

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### NO INFORMATION

Coalitions in this category disclose no information on their governance.

## MONITORING

### CLEAR MONITORING

“Clear” monitoring implies communication on the following various tools, depending on what its activities are: a full report of activities (dates, amount and source of funding, reports or summary notes on the project or activity, participants and/or beneficiaries, objectives and outcomes), a calculation of the coalition’s impact (number of beneficiaries, reduced greenhouse gas emissions, number of events organized including number of participants, campaign impacts, number of partners having received its certification, notes from institutional advocacy meetings). Finally, the coalition ensures the transparency of its activities thanks to activity reports and financial statements.

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### INSUFFICIENT MONITORING

“Insufficient” monitoring means that the coalition only reports on certain monitoring tools or does not provide as much detail as is done in the category above.

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### NO INFORMATION

Coalitions in this category disclose no information on their monitoring tools.

## 2. List of coalitions studied (July 1, 2020)

In bold, the sectors Agriculture, Land Use and Forestry, and Energy Production / Energy Efficiency

|  |  |  |   |  |
|--|--|--|---|--|
| 100 Resilient cities                                     | <b>Alliance for an Energy Efficient Economy</b>                    | Business Environmental Leadership Council      | <b>Central American Integration System Initiative</b> | CCAC : Global Green Freight Action Plan                              |
| 21st Century Truck Initiative                            | Alliances for Climate Action                                       | Business Leadership Criteria on Carbon Pricing | Cities and Regions' 5 year vision                     | <b>CCAC : Oil &amp; Gas Methane Partnership</b>                      |
| 250 Pathway Platform                                     | Alliance for Global Water Adaptation (AGWA)                        | C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group            | Cities Climate Finance Leadership Alliance            | CCAC : Phasing Down Climate Potent HFCs                              |
| 30 by 30 Resolution                                      | Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy                        | C40 Clean Bus Declaration                      | City Creditworthiness Partnership                     | CCAC : Waste, Mitigating SLCPs from the Municipal Solid Waste Sector |
| <b>4/1000 Initiative</b>                                 | America's Pledge   | C40 Zero Waste Declaration                     | Clean Air Asia  | Climate Action 100+  |
| Accelerating Change : Food and Beverages Leaders         | Assessing low Carbon Transition                                    | Carbon Cities Climate Registry (cCCR)          | Clean Air Fund  | Climate Action in Financial Institutions                             |
| <b>Accelerating Renewable Energy Transition in SIDS</b>  | Banking Environment Initiative                                     | Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance                 | Clean Air Initiative                                  | Climate Ambition Alliance : Net Zero 2050                            |
| Action Towards Climate Friendly Transport initiative     | <b>Below50</b>   | Carbon Neutrality coalition                    | Clean by Design                                       | Climate and Development Knowledge Network                            |
| <b>Adaptation for Small holder Agriculture Programme</b> | <b>Biocarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes</b> | Carbon Pricing for the Americas                | <b>Clean Cooking Fund</b>                             | <b>Climate and Land Use Alliance</b>                                 |
| Adaptation of West African Coastal Areas                 | Blue Growth Initiative   | Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition            | <b>Clean Energy Corridors in Africa</b>               | Climate Alliance   |
| African Adaptation Initiative                            | <b>Bonn Challenge</b>  | <b>Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum</b>   | <b>Clean Energy Ministerial</b>                       | Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance                         |
| <b>African Forest Landscape Restoration</b>              | <b>Breakthrough Energy Coalition</b>                               | Carbon War Room Shipping Initiative            | Clean Jobs Initiative                                 | <b>Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security</b>                 |
| <b>African Renewable Energy Initiative</b>               | Building Climate Resilience for the Urban Poor                     | Caring for Climate                             | Climate & Clean Air Coalition (CCAC)                  | Climate Change and Security  |
| <b>AgSTAR</b>  | Business Alliance for Water and Climate                            | Caribbean Climate-Smart Accelerator            | <b>CCAC Agriculture Initiative</b>                    | Climate Investment Platform  |
| Airport Carbon Accreditation                             | Businesses Ambition for 1,5°C                                      | <b>Central African Forests Initiative</b>      | CCAC : Bricks Initiative                              | Climate-KIC  |

|   |   |   |   |  |
|---|---|---|---|--|
| Climate Neutral Now   | <b>Covenant of Mayors for Climate &amp; Energy</b>              | EUROCITIES  | <b>Global Alliance for Energy Productivity</b>      | Global Initiative on Food and Waste Reduction - Save Food        |
| Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems Initiative           | Cycling Delivers on the Global Goals                            | <b>European Alliance to save Energy</b>                               | <b>Global Bioenergy Partnership</b>                 | <b>Global Geothermal Alliance</b>                                |
| <b>Climate Smart Agriculture Booster</b>                    | Debt Swap   | <b>European Initiative for Sustainable Development in Agriculture</b> | Global Buildings Performance Network                | Global Lead City Network on Sustainable Procurement              |
| ClimateWise   | Decarbonizing Shipping : Getting to Zero Coalition              | EV100   | <b>Global Campaign for Nature</b>                   | <b>Global Methane Initiative</b>                                 |
| Clinton Climate Initiative                                  | <b>Development smart initiative for research in Agriculture</b> | <b>EverGreen Agriculture Partnership</b>                              | <b>Global CCS Institute</b>                         | <b>Global Partnership on Forest Landscape Restoration</b>        |
| Coalition des philanthropes pour l'innovation               | DivestInvest  | Fashion Industry Charter for Climate Action                           | Global Clean Water Desalination Alliance            | Global Reporting Initiative                                      |
| Coalition for Climate Resilient Investment                  | EcoMobility Alliance  | Food Security Climate Resilience Facility                             | Global Commons Alliance                             | <b>Global Research Alliance on Agricultural Greenhouse Gases</b> |
| <b>Coalition for Sustainable Energy Access</b>              | Eco Partnerships  | <b>Forest Carbon Partnership Facility</b>                             | <b>Global Cool Cities Alliance</b>                  | <b>Global Solar Council</b>                                      |
| Coalition of Finance Minister for Climate Action            | <b>Energy cities</b>  | <b>Forest Stewardship Council</b>                                     | Global Coalition of Investor on Climate Change      | Global Subsidies Initiative                                      |
| Collaborative Climate Action Across the Air Transport World | <b>Energy Storage Initiative</b>                                | <b>Forest Trends</b>  | Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy      | Global Urbis   |
| <b>Collaborative Partnership on Forests</b>                 | Enhanced National Climate Plans Initiative                      | <b>Fossil Free - Divest from Fossil Fuel</b>                          | Global E-Sustainability Initiative                  | <b>Global Wind Energy Council</b>                                |
| Compact of Mayors   | <b>En.lighten Initiative</b>                                    | <b>Global 100% RE</b>   | Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery | <b>Go 100%</b>   |
| Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions                   | <b>EP100 Initiative</b>   | Global Alliance for Building and Construction                         | Global Fuel Economy Initiative                      | Gold Standard  |
| <b>Cool coalition</b>                                       | <b>ETIP Wind</b>  | <b>Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves</b>                           | <b>Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership</b>     | <b>Governor's Climate and Forest Task Force</b>                  |
| Corps Européen de Solidarité                                | EuroACE   | <b>Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture</b>                  | Global Initiative on Community Based Adaptation     | Great Green Wall Initiative                                      |

|   |  |   |   |  |
|---|--|---|---|--|
| Green Freight Asia Network  | InsuResilience Global Partnership  | InvestEU Program  | Low Carbon Sustainable Rail Transport Challenge         | Navigating a Changing Climate                            |
| Green Growth Platform   | InsuResilience Global Partnership Vision 2025                                  | Investment Leaders Group  | Low Carbon Technology Partnership Initiative            | Network for Greening the Financial System                |
| Greening the Financial System   | <b>Interfaith Rainforest Initiative</b>  | Investor Network on Climate Risk  | LCTPI Cement Sustainability Initiative                  | Net-Zero 2050  |
| Haga Initiative   | International Alliance to Combat Ocean Acidification                           | Joint Work Programme on Resilient Cities                                  | <b>LCTPI Climate Smart Agriculture</b>                  | Net-Zero Asset Owner Alliance                            |
| High Level Panel for Sustainable Ocean Economy                                | International Carbon Action Partnership  | Just Transition and Decent Jobs Pledge from the Private Sector            | <b>LCTPI Renewables</b>                                 | Net-Zero Carbon Buildings Commitment                     |
| ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability                                  | International Coalition for Sustainable Aviation                               | Kwon-Gesh Climate Pledge  | Low Carbon Vehicle Partnership                          | <b>New Vision for Agriculture</b>                        |
| <b>IEA Technology Collaboration Programme 4E</b>                              | International Coral Reef Initiative  | <b>Land Degradation Neutrality Fund</b>                                   | Low Emissions Development Strategies Global Partnership | <b>New York Declaration on Forests</b>                   |
| Implement the Recommendations of the Task Force in Climate Related Disclosure | International Council on Clean Transportation                                  | LDC-Visions 2050 / LDC Initiative for Effective Adaptation and Resilience | Megacities Alliance for Water and Climate               | <b>North American Climate Smart Agriculture Alliance</b> |
| <b>Initiative 20x20</b>   | International Development Finance Club   | Leadership for Urban Climate Investment                                   | Mexico City Pact  | Observatoire spatial du climat                           |
| Initiative Climat et Biodiversité dans le Pacifique                           | <b>International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation</b>             | Leadership Group for Industry and Transition                              | Milan Urban Food Policy Pact                            | Ocean Risk and Resilience Action Alliance                |
| Initiative Make our Planet Great Again  | <b>International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association</b> | Lean & Green  | <b>Mission Innovation</b>                               | <b>Ocean Renewable Energy Action Coalition</b>           |
| Initiative on Gender and Climate Change                                       | <b>International Solar Alliance</b>  | <b>Life Beef Carbon Initiative</b>  | Mobilize Your City Partnership                          | <b>Oil and Gas Climate Initiative</b>                    |
| Initiative in Protection of Cultural and Natural Heritage from Climate Change | International Zero-Emission Vehicle Alliance                                   | Logistics Carbon Reduction Scheme   | Montreal Carbon Pledge                                  | One Planet Business for Biodiversity Alliance            |
| Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change                               | Intelligent Transport Systems for Climate                                      | Low Carbon Road and Road Transport Initiative                             | <b>Nature4Climate</b>                                   | One Planet Charter                                       |

|  |  |   |   |   |
|--|--|---|---|---|
| One Planet Fellowship Program  | Private Financing Advisory Network                           | Renovate Europe   | Sports for Climate Action   | The 1 in 100 initiative                               |
| One Planet Sovereign Wealth Fund                                     | <b>Promotion of Smart Agriculture Towards Climate Change</b> | Resilience and Adaptation Call for Action                       | <b>Statement by Financial Institutions on Energy Efficiency Finance</b>         | <b>The 30x30 Forests, Food and Land Challenge</b>     |
| PACMUN Project   | <b>Protection of 400 million Hectares of Forests</b>         | Responsible Corporate Engagement in Climate Policy              | States and regions Annual Disclosure  | The Blue Carbon Initiative                            |
| <b>Palm Oil Innovation Group</b>                                     | R20  | Risk-Informed Early Action Partnership                          | Step-up Declaration : Powering Mission 2020                                     | The Climate Group                                     |
| Paris Collaborative on Green Budgeting                               | <b>R4 Rural Resilience Initiative</b>                        | <b>Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials</b>                   | <b>Super-efficient Equipment and Appliance Initiative</b>                       | The Climate Registry                                  |
| Paris Declaration on Electromobility on Climate Change               | <b>Rainforest Alliance</b>                                   | <b>Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil</b>                       | <b>Support for Smallholder Farmers</b>  | <b>The Global Forum on Agriculture Research</b>       |
| Paris Pact on Water and Adaptation                                   | <b>RE100 Initiative</b>                                      | Science Based Targets Initiative                                | <b>Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform</b>                              | The Prince of Wales's Corporate Leaders Group         |
| Partnership for Procurement and Green Growth                         | Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutant Emissions               | <b>SEforAll : Global Energy Efficiency Accelerator Platform</b> | <b>Sustainable Agriculture Network</b>  | <b>Three Percent Club for Energy</b>                  |
| Partnership on Sustainable, Low Carbon Transport                     | Refrigerants, Naturally!                                     | SEforAll : Building Efficiency Accelerator                      | <b>Sustainable India Finance Facility - Zero Budget Natural Farming</b>         | <b>Towards a Cleaner Electricity in Latin America</b> |
| Partnership on Transparency in the Paris Agreement                   | Regionsadapt Initiative                                      | <b>SEforAll : District Energy Initiative</b>                    | Sustainable Mobility for All Partnership  | Toward Carbon Neutrality                              |
| Planners for Climate Action  | <b>Remove Commodity - driven Deforestation</b>               | SEforAll :Energy and Transport                                  | Sustainable Procurement   | Transformative Actions Program                        |
| Plateforme de financement 100 projets "Eau et Climat" pour l'Afrique | <b>REN Alliance</b>  | SEforAll : Industrial Energy Efficiency Accelerator             | Sustainable Shipping Initiative   | Transformative Urban Mobility Initiative              |
| <b>Plateforme européenne pour les régions intensives en charbon</b>  | <b>Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century</b>  | SIDS 2020 Ambition Leadership                                   | <b>Task-Force for Clean Energy Transition on accelerating energy transition</b> | Transition Network                                    |
| Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition                                  | <b>Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership</b>    | <b>SIDS Lighthouse Initiative</b>                               | Task Force in Climate-related Financial Disclosure                              | Transport Decarbonization Alliance                    |
| <b>Powering Past Coal Alliance</b>                                   | <b>Renewable Energy Buyers Alliance</b>                      | Smart Risk Investing  | Taxi4SmartCities  | <b>Tropical Landscape Finance Facility</b>            |

|   |   |                                |  |  |
|---|---|--------------------------------|--|--|
| <b>Tropical Forest Alliance</b>               | United Smart Cities                       | US Climate Alliance            | WBCSD Urban Infrastructure Initiative  | WWF Climate Savers   |
| Under2Coalition                               | <b>UN-REDD+ Programme</b>                 | Value Chain Risk to Resilience | We are Still In                        | WWF Earth Hour City Challenge  |
| UNEP Finance Initiative                       | Urban Electric Mobility Initiative        | Verra                          | WeMeanBusiness Coalition               | Zero Carbon Building for all   |
| UNEP Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles | Urban-Low Emission Development Strategies | <b>Vote Solar Initiative</b>   | World Green Building Council           | <b>Zero Deforestation Commitments from Commodity Producers and Traders</b> |
| <b>United for Efficiency</b>                  | Urban Transitions Alliance                | Walk21                         | World Mayors Council on Climate Change | Zero Routine Flaring by 2030   |

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